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Mental States as Emergent Properties
From Walking to Consciousness
Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling
In this article we propose a bottom-up approach to higher-level mental states,
such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness. The idea behind
this bottom-up approach is that higher-level properties may arise as emergent
properties, i.e., occur without requiring explicit implementation of the phenomenon
under  examination.  Using  a  neural  architecture  that  shows  the  abilities  of
autonomous agents, we want to come up with quantitative hypotheses concerning
cognitive mechanisms, i.e., to come up with testable predictions concerning the
underlying structure and functioning of an autonomous system that can be tested
in a robot-control system. 
We do not want to build an artificial system that is, for example, conscious
in the first place. On the contrary, we want to construct a system able to control
behavior. Only then will this system be used as a tool to test to what extent de-
scriptions of mental phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be
applied to such an artificial system. Originally these phenomena are necessarily
defined using verbal formulations that allow for interpreting them differently. A
functional definition, in contrast, does not suffer from being ambiguous, because it
can be expressed explicitly using mathematical formulations that can be tested,
for example, in a quantitative simulation. It is important to note that we are not
concerned with the “hard” problem of consciousness, i.e., the subjective aspect of
mental phenomena. This approach is possible because, adopting a monist view, we
assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem without losing information con-
cerning the possible function of these phenomena. In other words, we assume that
phenomenality is an inherent property of both access consciousness and metacog-
nition (or reflexive consciousness). Following these arguments, we claim that our
network does not only show emergent properties on the reactive level;  it  also
shows that mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or con-
sciousness can be observed, too. Concerning consciousness, we argue that proper-
ties assumed to partially constitute access consciousness are present in our net-
work, including the property of global availability, which means that elements of
the procedural memory can be addressed even if they do not belong to the current
context. Further expansions are discussed that may allow for the recognition of
properties attributed to metacognition or reflexive consciousness. 
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1 Introduction
In this article we propose a bottom-up approach
to higher-level  mental  states,  such as,  for  ex-
ample,  consciousness.  In  contrast  to  most  re-
lated approaches, we do not take consciousness
as  our  point  of  departure,  but  rather  aim,
firstly,  to  construct  a  system  that  has  basic
properties  of  a  reactive  system.  In  a  second
step, this system will be expanded and will gain
cognitive properties in the sense of being able to
plan ahead. Only after this work is finished, we
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ask to what extent this system is equipped with
higher-level properties as for example emotions
or consciousness. While other approaches would
require an exact definition of, for example, con-
sciousness, in our case we do not have to start
from a clear-cut definition and try to fit it into
a model.  We follow this  alternative  route  be-
cause there are no generally accepted definitions
concerning  these  higher-level  phenomena.  In
this way we hope to identify the essential ele-
ments required to instantiate, for example, con-
sciousness.
The  idea  behind  this  approach  is  that
higher-level  properties  may  arise  as  emergent
properties, i.e., may occur without requiring ex-
plicit implementation of the phenomenon under
examination but instead arise from the coopera-
tion of lower-level elements. Some authors dis-
tinguish  between  “strong”  emergence  and
“weak”  emergence  (e.g.,  Laughlin &  Pines
2000).  Strong  emergence  means  that  there  is
principally  no  way  to  explain  the  emergent
property by known properties of the elements of
the  system  and  their  coupling.  Here  we  are
dealing  with  weak  emergence.  In  this  case,  a
property recognized when looking at the whole
system can at first glance not be traced back
(or perhaps only partially) to known properties
of the elements and their couplings. Often, aux-
iliary  assumptions  are  made  to  explain  this
property as a global property, i.e., as a property
ascribed to the system as a whole. A more de-
tailed inspection may, however, show that such
auxiliary assumptions are not required. Instead,
the emergent property follows from the proper-
ties  of  the  elements  and the  specific  ways  in
which they causally interact. This insight allows
for an understanding of an emergent property in
the sense that this property can be predicted,
although we may not understand why it arises,
and that one is able to construct a new system
showing this property.
Following  this  approach,  one  crucial  de-
cision to be made at the beginning concerns the
granularity of  the lower-level elements.  In our
approach, we start from a behavioral perspect-
ive and focus on the nervous system as central
to the control of action. Therefore, we use neur-
onal units as the basic elements for our model-
ing and for the analysis. Specifically, we use ar-
tificial neural network units with analogue ac-
tivation  values  and  dynamic  (low-pass  filter)
properties1.  That  is,  our  neural  elements  are
qualitatively comparable with non-spiking neur-
ons.  Although  there  are  arguments  that  con-
sciousness, in order to arise, might require syn-
chronously  oscillating  spikes  (Singer &  Gray
1995), we claim that the level applied here is
general enough to allow for an understanding of
such  mental  processes.  As  a  side  effect,  this
level of abstraction covers different evolutionary
groups, such as those represented by insects and
mammals,  for  example.  Though  much  of  our
discussion, below, focuses on the example of in-
sects, we do not want to argue that insects have
all the higher-level properties addressed later in
this article, but only that they share the same
fundamental  functions  used  in  motor  control
and have, on that level, a comparable structure.
Using  these  simple  neural  elements,  we
start by implementing very basic faculties that
include  the  ability  to  move  one’s  own  (non-
1 A low-pass filter is qualitatively characterized by an increase of out-
put activation that, when excited by a constant stimulus, asymptot-
ically approaches a given output value.
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Figure 1: Arrangement of the leg-controllers (boxes: FL
front left, ML middle left, HL hind left, FR front right,
MR middle right, HL hind right) of the hexapod walker.
The arrows show coordinating influences (1–4) that act
between neighbouring leg-controllers.
www.open-mind.net
trivial2)  body,  and  allow  for  orientation  and
navigation in an only partially known environ-
ment. To this end we use a body with six, in-
sect-like legs. This means that we deal with at
least eighteen active degrees of freedom (DoF)
and not  two—as is  the case  for  many robots
that are restricted to moving around on a two-
dimensional plane. This means that the control-
ler has to deal with a large number of redund-
ant DoFs. To control the behavior of the robot
we use a reactive and embodied neuronal con-
troller, as it is available from earlier work on in-
sect behavior (Schilling et al. 2013a). Later, a
minor expansion of the network will allow for
cognitive faculties.
What  are  the  properties  of  the
reactive/cognitive system considered here? The
reactive  system is  called  “Walknet”  and  it  is
based  on  biological  insights  from experiments
2 I.e., a body with redundant degrees of freedom arranged in both par-
allel and serial order.
on the walking behavior of stick insects (Dürr et
al. 2004;  Bläsing 2006;  Schilling et al. 2013b).
As will be explained in section 2, Walknet was
set up as a system for controlling the walking
behavior of a six-legged system in an unpredict-
able environment, e.g., on cluttered terrain or
climbing  over  large  gaps—which,  when  per-
formed in a realistic, natural environment is a
non-trivial  task. Already on this level  we can
observe  emergent  properties.  The  number  of
legs on the ground differs depending on the ve-
locity  of  the  walker  (for  slower  walking  more
legs are on the ground). As a consequence the
phase relations between different legs differ de-
pending on the velocity of the walker. Import-
antly, the resulting stepping patterns (“gaits”)
are not  explicitly encoded in the control  net-
work, but are a result of the interaction of the
control network with the environment as medi-
ated through the body (1st order embodiment
Metzinger 2014). In a further step, the reactive
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Figure 2: The network controlling the reactive system. Motivation units (red) form an RNN that can assume various
attractor states (only two leg-controllers are shown). Arrows show excitatory influences, T-shaped connections show in-
hibitory influences (fw forward, bw backward, r1 coordination rule 1) The motivation units at the lower margin control
procedures (boxes, e.g., swing, stance). The procedures include the internal body model (blue). The body is marked by
dashed boxes (“leg”). Indicated here is the network Navinet that controls walking direction (see figure 4 for more de-
tails).
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controller is expanded to be able to deal with
navigation  tasks.  This  additional  network,
called “Navinet”, is able to simulate a number
of experimental results observed in desert ants
and honeybees, such as the capability of finding
food sources using path integration and orienta-
tion with respect to visual landmarks. 
Both networks are characterized by their
decentralized nature. These networks consist of
procedural,  (reactive)  elements,  namely  small
neural networks that in general connect sensory
input with motor output, thereby forming the
procedural  memory.  Inspired  by  (Maes 1991),
these  procedural  elements  are  coupled  via  a
“motivation  unit  network”,  a  recurrent  neural
network (RNN) that forms the backbone of the
complete system. This type of architecture has
been  termed  MUBCA  (for  Motivation  Unit
Based  Columnar  Architecture  (MUBCA),
Schilling et al. 2013b). The motivation unit net-
work allows for selection of different behaviors
by  adopting  different  attractor  states,  where
each attractor represents a group of motivation
units being activated, which in turn control the
procedural elements. As the different groups do
in part overlap, albeit in different ways, the net-
work allows for the representation of  a heter-
archical  structure (e.g.,  see left  upper part  of
figure 2). 
As a next “evolutionary” step, this react-
ive network will be expanded to be able to em-
brace cognitive properties (sects. 3 and 6). The
notion of cognition is often used in a broad and
sometimes unspecific way. In the following we
will rely on the definition given by  McFarland
&  Bösser (1993) who assume that  a cognitive
system is characterized by the capability of plan-
ning ahead. We prefer this clear-cut definition of
cognition compared to many others found in the
literature, as the latter are generally quite weak
(in extreme cases cognitive properties are even
attributed  to  bacteria,  which,  in  our  view,
would  make  the  term cognition  meaningless).
While such a specific definition might seem too
narrow, in our understanding it captures the es-
sence of cognition. Focusing on planning ahead
being  realized  by  mental  simulation  (Hesslow
2002) allows extending this notion of cognition
to  easily  include  other  high-level  phenomena,
while still relying on the same internal mechan-
ism. Therefore, in this article, apart from sec-
tion 10.3 (Metacognition) we will use the term
cognition in the strict sense as proposed by Mc-
Farland & Bösser (1993). 
Being able to plan ahead implies the cap-
ability of being able to internally simulate beha-
vior, which basically means to be able to simu-
late  movements  of  one’s  own  body  within  a
given environment. This faculty requires,  as a
first step, the availability of a flexible, “manip-
ulable” internal body-model. Planning ahead is
interesting in a situation where the actually car-
ried out reactive behavior cannot reach the cur-
rently pending goal. Therefore, a further expan-
sion is required that allows for the invention of
new  behaviors.  Together  with  the  faculty  of
planning ahead, the system can then test newly-
invented behaviors by applying internal simula-
tion (“internal trial-and-error”) in order to find
a solution for novel problems for which no solu-
tion is currently known to the system.3
This system, called “reaCog”, represents a
basic version of a cognitive system in the strict
sense intended by  McFarland & Bösser (1993).
As such, cognitive expansion does not function
by itself, but only, like a parasite, on top of the
reactive structures—a view that has been sup-
ported  for  a  long  time  (Norman &  Shallice
1986). The cognitive system depends on its re-
active  basis  (therefore  it  is  called  reaCog).
Therefore,  the  evolution  of  cognitive  abilities
crucially  requires  a  correspondingly  rich (pro-
cedural) memory.
In  order  to  increase  the  richness  of  the
memory of the complete system, in section 5 we
introduce perceptual memory and complete the
system by implementing “Word-nets”, a specific
form of procedural and perceptual memory. In
this way, the whole system is equipped with as-
pects of semantic memory, and can be claimed
to represent a minimal cognitive system. We do
not  deal  with  learning  but  only  discuss  the
properties of the finished network. The learning
3 Note that the term simulation is used here in two different ways. “In-
ternal simulation” enables the agent to simulate behaviors internally,
i.e. without actually performing them in reality. Simulation of an an-
imal addresses the construction of an artificial agent. The agent may
take the form of a software simulation or a hardware simulation (i.e.,
a physical robot).
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of  some  aspects  has,  however,  been  treated
earlier (Hoinville et al. 2012;  Cruse & Schilling
2010a).
After having introduced reaCog in sections
2–6, we will, in sections 7–11, discuss how more
abstract functions, such as those described in,
e.g., psychology, can be based on such a simply-
structured network.
A fundamental problem when aiming for
an understanding of  phenomena like emotions
or  consciousness  concerns  the  phenomenal  as-
pect. The phenomenal aspect, often character-
ized  as  the  hard  problem  (Chalmers 1997),
refers  to  the  strange,  unexplainable  phe-
nomenon that physical systems, in our case rep-
resented by specific dynamics of neuronal struc-
tures, can be accompanied by subjective experi-
ence.  Basic  examples  are experiencing pain,  a
color, or the internal state of an emotion (e.g.,
joy, fear). In section 7 we discuss this aspect in
some detail and postulate that phenomenality is
an emergent property. As mentioned, we are not
aiming to solve the “hard” problem (Chalmers
1997), but we argue that it is sufficient to con-
centrate on the functional aspect.
In particular, we focus on the phenomena
of emotions and consciousness. According to a
number of authors (e.g.,  Valdez & Mehrabian
1994),  these  are  assumed  to  be  an  inherent
property  for  some  cognitive  systems.  There-
fore,  although we do not want to state that
emotions (section 8), attention, volition, inten-
tion  (section  9),  and  consciousness  (section
10)  should  necessarily  be  attributed  to  our
system in  any  sense,  we  want  to  discuss  to
what extent properties characterized by differ-
ent  levels  of  description  can  be  observed  in
our model. 
Considering emotions, these are defined on
different levels in the literature, so that there is
no clear, generally accepted distinction between
concepts  like  emotions,  moods,  motivations,
drives, etc., which appear to form a continuum
of  overlapping,  not  clearly  separable  concepts
(Pérez et  al. 2012).  Focusing  on  selected  ex-
amples,  in  section  8 we  will  show how these
phenomena may be attributed to our system,
for example by referring to basic  emotions as
proposed by Ekman (1999).
Concerning consciousness, as discussed by
Cleeremans (2005), this phenomenon should be
approached by differentiating different  aspects
and treating those  aspects  separately.  To this
end, following  Block (1995,  2001),  Cleeremans
(2005), introduces a distinction between access
consciousness,  metacognition,  and  phenomenal
consciousness.  In  sections  10.1 (access  con-
sciousness) and 10.3 (metacognition) we will fo-
cus on whether and how the presented model
can be related to the different aspects that are
described by Cleeremans (2005), such as access
consciousness  and  metacognition.  From  our
point  of  view  the  simple  control  structure
presented does fulfill some aspects of both ac-
cess consciousness and metacognition. We shall
finish with discussion and conclusion in  sects.
11, 12.4
2 Walknet 
ReaCog is an expansion of a control system that
has been realized as a neural network. The un-
derlying  system  has  been  termed  Walknet.
Walknet is biologically inspired and is supposed
to describe the results of many behavioral stud-
ies  on  the  walking  behavior  of  stick  insects
(Dürr et al. 2004;  Schilling et al. 2013b). We
will briefly sketch the properties of the network
as far as is required for understanding the basic
abilities considered here.
Overall,  the  controller  has  to  deal  with
the difficult task of coordinating multiple de-
grees  of  freedom; in the case of  the hexapod
walker  the  body consists  of  twenty-two DoF.
There are three DoF for each of  the six legs
and  an  additional  four  DoF  are  present  in
between the body segments. The system is re-
dundant, as only six DoFs are needed to define
a position and orientation in three-dimensional
space. The controller therefore has to to deal
with  sixteen  extra  DoFs.  The  architecture  of
the  Walknet  controller  is  decentral.  Each leg
has an individual and more or less independent
controller that decides which action to choose
(two such leg-controllers are shown in figure 2,
the black boxes in the lower part). A single leg
4 This  article  comprises  an  essential  extension  of  an  earlier  paper
(Cruse & Schilling 2013).
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controller consists of several procedures. In the
figure, each procedure is represented as a single
black box. In the basic system, the two import-
ant behaviors a leg can perform are the swing
and stance  movement.  The  procedures  them-
selves are realized as artificial RNN. Examples
are the two basic procedures: the “Swing-net”,
which  controls  the  swing  movement,  and the
“Stance-net”, which controls the stance move-
ment of the leg. Only two of the six leg-con-
trollers  are shown.  These  networks constitute
the procedural memory of the system. The pro-
cedural  modules  receive  direct  sensory  input
and  provide  motor  control  commands  as  an
output.  But  there  are  also  modules  that
provide input to another module. The control-
ler on the leg level determines which procedure
should be actived at any given time, depending
on  the  current  state  of  the  leg  (swing  or
stance), as well as on sensory inputs (ground
contact,  position).  In  addition,  controllers  of
neighboring  legs  can  influence  each  other
through  a  small  number  of  connections
between those controllers. These influences are
explicitly derived from experiments on the co-
ordination  of  legs  in  walking  experiments  on
the stick insect. 
As  was  found in  the  insects,  during  the
swing movement (protraction) the legs aim to-
wards a position at the front, close to the posi-
tion of the anterior leg. Therefore, each leg pos-
sesses a so-called “target net” in order to pro-
duce these targeted movements. During forward
walking  the  so-called  “Target_fw-net”  is  re-
sponsible  for  this  targeting.  During  backward
walking “Target_bw-net” is used. Both directly
influence the Swing-net. Procedures marked as
blue boxes (“body model”, “leg model”) will be
explained below (section 3.1).
ReaCog is expanded by an RNN, which
consists of motivation units (figure  2, marked
in  red).  This  network  allows  the  system  to
autonomously select one of the different pos-
sible behaviors. For example, the system may
choose between forward or backward walking,
or standing. A motivation unit is an artificial
neuron  with  linear  summation  input  and
piecewise  linear  activation  function,  showing
output values from zero to one. Applied to a
procedure,  for  example  Swing-net,  a  motiva-
tion unit determines the strength of the out-
put of  the corresponding procedural  network
(in a multiplicative way). As mentioned above,
motivation units form a recurrent neural net-
work and can influence each other through ex-
citatory  or  inhibitory  connections  (as  shown
in figure 2). 
In addition, there are sensory units that
are part of this RNN and that can directly in-
fluence the motivation units’  activation, e.g.,
as shown in figure 2 for the “lower-level” units
for  Swing  and  Stance.  There,  an  active
ground-contact  sensor  of  a  leg reinforces  the
stance motivation unit for this leg. As the mo-
tivation  unit  network  can  be  arbitrarily  ex-
panded, it allows to control of complex beha-
viors. To illustrate a small group of behaviors
only,  units  as  “walk”,  “fw”  (forward),  “bw”
(backward), “leg1” are depicted (for more ex-
amples  see  Schilling et  al. 2013b;  Cruse &
Wehner 2011).
The network of  motivation  and sensory
units does not have to form a simple, tree-like
structure  (see  figure  2).  It  can  constitute  a
heterarchy.  Motivation units can be bi-direc-
tionally  connected  through  positive  (arrow-
heads) and negative (T-shaped heads) connec-
tions. As shown in the figure, this can lead to
cycles.  There  are  also  different  overlapping
subnetworks,  e.g.,  the  “leg”  units  as  well  as
the motivation unit for “walk” are active dur-
ing backward and forward walking. But only
one  unit  indicating  the  direction  of  walking
can be active at any given time, i.e. either the
unit  “fw”  or  “bw” can be  active.  As a con-
sequence,  there  are  multiple  stable  attractor
states formed through the combinations of ex-
citatory  and  inhibitory  connections.  The
stable “internal states” stabilize the behavior
of  the  overall  control  system,  as  the  system
cannot be easily disturbed solely through in-
appropriate sensory inputs. For example, sens-
ory  inputs  are  treated  differently  depending
on the current state (swing or stance) of the
control system, and these internal states can
be  differentiated  on  a  higher-level,  e.g.,  into
walking,  standing,  or  feeding (for  details  see
Schilling et al. 2013a; Schilling et al. 2013b).
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Figure  3:  Step pattern  arising from the  decentralized
leg-controllers connected by local rules and the environ-
ment. Abscissa is time; black bars indicate swing move-
ment;  the  gaps  represent  stance  movement  of  this  leg
(from top to bottom: front left leg (FL), middle left leg
(ML), hind left leg (HL), correspondingly front right leg
(FR), middle right leg (MR) and hind right leg (HR) for
the right side). The lower bars indicate 500 iterations cor-
responding  to  5s  real  time.  These  “foot-fall  patterns”
show various locally or globally stable patterns depending
on walking velocity (a: slow, b: fast) and of starting posi-
tion. In (a) the legs start with an “uncomfortable” leg
configuration leading to a gallop-like pattern (indicated
by the vertical ellipses) that after about six steps changes
to  the  globally  stable  pattern,  typical  for  slow  insect
walking (see inclined ellipses, step # 8). (b) shows fast
walking leading to  a  tripod gait  characterized by syn-
chronous swing movements of ML, FR, HR and FL, HL,
MR (see vertical ellipses).
For an RNN, maintaining a stable state is
a non-trivial problem, in particular, when there
are various disturbances.  To illustrate the ad-
aptability and at the same time the stability of
the  behavior  controlled  by  such  a  motivation
unit network, in figure 3 we show two cases of
hexapod walking. Figure  3a shows an example
of  a slow walking speed where the legs begin
from  a  difficult  starting  configuration  (both
front legs, both middle legs and both hind legs
start from the same position, which is opposite
to  the  coordination  found in  normal  walking,
where opposite legs alternate). Nonetheless, the
agent  is  able  to  walk.  After  some  steps,  the
agent reaches a temporally stable pattern cor-
responding to normal walking. Figure 3b shows
a  step  pattern  corresponding  to  high-speed
walking,  often termed “tripod gait”.  Although
usually considered to be a regular pattern, de-
tailed inspection shows that there are local tem-
poral variations, but the overall pattern remains
stable (for videos of  further walking examples
see  Schilling et  al. 2013b). It  is  important to
note that none of these step-patterns are expli-
citly implemented, but arise as emergent prop-
erties (for details see Schilling et al. 2013a). As
another  impressive  emergent  property,  Bläsing
(2006)  showed  that,  with  some  minor  exten-
sions,  this  walker  is  able  to  climb  over  large
obstacles  (which  can be  more  than twice  the
normal step-width).
3 Internal representation 
In addition to using the loop through the envir-
onment itself, some form of internalization is a
prerequisite for any kind of planning. Therefore,
specific  internal  representations5 are  necessary
for a cognitive system. This is well in line with
the  embodied  perspective,  because  from  an
evolutionary point of view internal models are
not at first disconnectable from a very specific
function, and they work in service of a specific
behavior (Glenberg 1997). Internal models have,
in this sense,  co-evolved with behavior (Steels
2003). An early representation is the representa-
tion of one’s own body, and such a representa-
tion  becomes  meaningful  early  on,  in  simple
control tasks like targeted movements or sensor
fusion.
3.1 Body model 
In reaCog we introduced an internal model of
the  body.  This  model  is  realized  as  an  RNN
(Schilling 2011)  and  has  a  modular  structure
(Schilling &  Cruse 2007;  Schilling et al. 2012).
The  overall  model  consists  of  two  different
5 The term representation is used here in the broad sense of  Steels
(1995)  “physical  structures  (for  example  electro-chemical  states)
which have correlations with aspects of the environment”.
Cruse, H. & Schilling, M. (2015). Mental States as Emergent Properties - From Walking to Consciousness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 9(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570436 7 | 38
www.open-mind.net
levels. On the top level the whole body and the
structure of the insect are represented in an ab-
stract way. Only on the lower level are the de-
tails filled in. The lower level consists of six leg
networks.  Here,  for  each  leg  the  functional
structure of the joints and the limb is captured.
In this way this level of representation can be
used for motor control and provides detailed in-
formation  about  joint  movements.  On  the
higher level, the structure of the body and the
legs is represented in an abstract form, i.e., only
the footholds of the legs appear on this level.
Figure  2 shows the different parts of the body
model (drawn in blue). The body model is mod-
ular. It comprises a holistic system that is real-
ized as an RNN (figure  5,  see  Schilling 2011;
Schilling et al. 2012 for details).
The  body  model  is  used  during  normal
walking, meaning that the system is still in the
reactive mode, in forward as well as backward
walking or when negotiating curves. It coordin-
ates the movement of the joints and delivers the
appropriate control signals for the Stance-net-
works. As explained above, overall the system is
redundant, with twenty-two DoFs in the whole
body structure, and this makes deriving consist-
ent control signals for all the joints a difficult
problem that can’t  be computed directly,  but
rather requires application of additional criteria
(e.g.,  for  optimizing  energy  consumption).  In
our  approach,  which  uses  the  internal  body
model, we employ the passive motion paradigm
(von Kleist 1810; Mussa-Ivaldi et al. 1988; Loeb
2001). Consider the body model as a simulated
puppet of the body (figure 5) that is pulled by
its head in the direction of the goal (figure 5b,
pull_fw). This information on the target direc-
tion could be provided by sensory input, e.g.,
from the antennae or vision, in the form of a
target  vector  (figure  2,  sensory  input).  When
pulled in this direction, the whole model should
take up this movement and therefore the indi-
vidual legs currently in stance should follow the
movement in an appropriate way. The induced
changes in the joints can be read out and ap-
plied  as motor commands in  order  to control
the real joints. In backward or curved walking,
the body model has only to be pulled into a
corresponding  direction  (in  backward  walking
using  the  vector  attached to  the  back of  the
body model, pull_bw (figure  5b). In this way
we obtain an easy solution to the inverse kin-
ematic  problem as  the  body-model  represents
the kinematical constraints of the body of the
walker. It restrains the possible movements of
the individual joints through these constraints,
and only allows possible solutions for the legs
standing on the ground, thereby providing co-
ordinated movements in all the involved joints.
The body-model is also connected to the
sensors of the walking system and integrates the
incoming  sensory  information  into  the  cur-
rently-assumed state of the body as represented
in the body-model. In this way the body-model
is able to correct noisy or incorrect sensory data
(Schilling & Cruse 2012). Overall, the main task
of the body model is pattern completion. It uses
the current state and incoming sensory data to
come up with the most likely state of the body
that fulfils  the encoded kinematic  constraints.
In this way, the model can also be used as a for-
ward-model, meaning that, given specific joint
configuration, the model can predict the three-
dimensional  arrangement  of  the  body,  for  ex-
ample the position of the leg tips. The predict-
ive nature of the model is crucial as it allows
exploiting the model for planning ahead (see be-
low). It is important to note that while we do
not want to claim the existence of such a model
in insects, the functions of internal models are
prediction, inverse function, and sensor fusion,
and these can all already be found in insects.
3.2 Representation of the environment
Of  course,  internal  representation  should  also
contain  information  on  the  surroundings.  We
started with a focus on the body and want to
extend this network in a way that reflects how
the environment affords (Gibson 1979) itself to
the body, i.e., a focus on interaction with the
environment. 
As an example of how the reaCog architec-
ture could be extended to include representa-
tion of meaningful parts of the environment, we
want to briefly sketch an expansion of Walknet
that  would  allow  for  insect-like  navigation
(“Navinet”  Cruse &  Wehner 2011;  Hoinville et
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al. 2012). Navinet provides an output that will
be used by the body-model explained above to
guide  walking  direction.  Due  to  the  network,
the agent can make an informed decision about
which learned food source she will  visit  (e.g.,
sources A, B or C), or if she is travelling back
home or not (Outbound, Inbound, respectively).
The output of Navinet is, in this way, on the
one hand tightly coupled to the control of walk-
ing and the representation of the body. On the
other hand, Navinet is constructed using motiv-
ation units in the same way as the walking con-
troller, and those motivation units take part in
the action-selection process.  Importantly, Nav-
inet (like desert ants) shows the capability of se-
lective attention, since it is context dependent
and only responds to learned visual landmarks
in the appropriate context, i.e., when related to
the current active target food source. The struc-
ture of the motivation-unit network is sketched
in figure 4. Examples of possible stable internal
states  are  (Forage  –  Outbound –  source  A –
landmarks  associated  with  source  A)  or  (In-
bound – landmarks associated with Inbound),
Cruse, H. & Schilling, M. (2015). Mental States as Emergent Properties - From Walking to Consciousness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 9(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570436 9 | 38
Figure 4: Motivation unit network of Navinet for the control of ant-like navigation. Unit Outbound controls travel
from the home to a food source (A, B, C) or a default search for a new source (D). Unit Inbound controls travel back
to the home. Memory elements (black boxes) contain position and quality of the food source (A, B, C) or information
on visual landmarks (landmark memory). 
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for instance. As an interesting emergent prop-
erty,  Navinet  does  not  presuppose  an  explicit
“cognitive map”. Such a map-like representation
has been assumed necessary by several other au-
thors (Cruse & Wehner 2011). How learning of
food source positions and food quality is pos-
sible has been shown by Hoinville et al. (2012).
4 Planning ahead, cognition
Even though Walknet is set up as a fixed struc-
ture consisting of hard-wired connections of the
RNN, it can flexibly adapt to disturbances in
the environment as needed during, for instance,
crossing large gaps (Bläsing 2006). Nonetheless,
the system might of course run into novel situ-
ations that require an even higher degree of ad-
aption, and as such will require novel behaviors.
As an example, think of a situation in which all
the legs except the right hind leg are in the an-
terior  part  of  the  working  range.  When  the
right hind leg is forced to lift from the ground
as it approaches a position very far to the rear,
the whole system will become unstable, as the
center of gravity is positioned very far towards
the rear of the animal. In this case, the center
of gravity would not be supported by the other
legs, nor by the right hind leg that tries to start
a swing movement. As a consequence, the agent
would fall over, backwards. This problem could
be detected by “problem detectors”,  e.g.,  spe-
cific  sensory  input  that  reacts  to  the  specific
load  distribution  (a  different  solution  is  ex-
plained in section 8). In order to overcome this
problem, the system would have to break out of
its usual pattern of behavioral selection and try
to select a different behavioral module that is
usually not applicable in the given context. For
instance, making a step backward with the right
middle leg would be a possible solution, as this
would provide support for the body and would
afterwards allow going back to the normal walk-
ing behavior  and the subsequent swing move-
ment of the right hind leg. Usually, backward
steps  can  only  be  selected  in  the  context  of
backward walking.
Figure  6 shows an expansion that allows
the system to search for solutions that are not
connected to the current context. This expan-
sion is termed the “attention controller”. We in-
troduce  a  third  layer  of  units  (figure  6,  in
green),  that  is  essentially  a  recurrent  winner-
take-all network (WTA-net).  For each motiva-
tion unit there is a corresponding partner unit
in this WTA-network. Currently-active motiva-
tion units suppress their winner-take-all (WTA)
partner  units  (T-shaped  connections  in  figure
6).  Therefore,  a  random  activation  of  this
WTA-net  will  lead  to  the  activation  of  one
single unit not belonging to the currently- activ-
ated context. The random activation will be in-
duced by another parallel layer, the “Spreading
Activation Layer” (not depicted in figure 6, fur-
ther details are described in (Schilling & Cruse
submitted). The winning unit of the WTA layer
than  activates  its  corresponding  motivation
unit. This triggers the connected behavior that
can be tested as a solution to the problem at
hand.  The  network  follows  a  trial-and-error
strategy as observed in, e.g., insects. 
As has been proposed (Schilling & Cruse
2008), a further expansion of the system that
is,  most probably, not given in insects is  not
the testing of a behavior in reality, but instead
the application of a newly-selected behavior on
the body-model and the use of the model in-
stead of  the  real  body.  The motor output  is
routed to the body-model instead of to the real
body, and the real body is decoupled from the
control  system  while  testing  new  behaviors.
Due  to  the  predictive  nature  of  the  body-
model, it can be used to predict possible con-
sequences and to afterwards decide if a beha-
vior solves the current problem and should be
tried out on the real body. This procedure is
called internal simulation and requires the in-
troduction of switches that reroute motor out-
put  signals  from the  real  body  to  the  body
model (figure 6, switch SW). Only after a suc-
cessful internal simulation will the behavior be
applied to the real body.  McFarland & Bösser
(1993) defined a cognitive system as a system
that  has  the  ability  of  planning  ahead,  i.e.,
that is able to perform internal simulations in
order to predict possible outcomes of  behavi-
ors.  Therefore,  this  latter  expansion  would
make the control system cognitive (for details
see Cruse & Schilling 2010b). 
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5 Word-net and perceptual memory
In our network, we have up to this point only
dealt with procedural memories, i.e., memories
representing  the  connections  between  specific
sensorimotor elements that are able to control
specific  behaviors  (e.g.,  Swingnet,  landmark).
As a final extension, we will now show how the
network might also be equipped with some as-
pect  of  semantic  memory,  such  that  meaning
can be attributed to verbal expressions. To this
end, the network can be expanded through the
introduction of another layer (not shown in fig-
ure  6). In this fourth layer, verbal expressions
are stored as procedures or “Word-nets”. These
procedures can either be used to pronounce a
stored word or to comprehend it, i.e., they can
be used for motor control and for auditory per-
ception.  As  is  the  case  for  other  procedures,
each  Word-net  is  equipped with  a motivation
unit. As the motivation units of Word-nets have
a specific function, for an easier distinction we
will  call  them  word  units  (WU).  Following
Steels (2007;  Steels &  Belpaeme 2005)  each
Word-net is related to a corresponding unit of
the  motivation  network  that  carries  meaning
(e.g., the motivation unit for walking is connec-
ted to a Word-net “walk”). The meaning of the
Word-nets is in this way grounded in the beha-
viors of the corresponding motivation units. As
an example, figure 7 shows a possible detail of
such  a  network,  including  some  elements  of
Walknet and Navinet. The motivation units of a
procedure (e.g., Swing net) and its correspond-
ing Word-net (e.g., “Swing”) are coupled via bi-
directional  connections  (dashed  double-headed
arrows).  The  connections  cannot  be  active  at
the same time, but depend on an overall state
of  the  network,  termed  “Report”  and  “Per-
ceive”. In the Perceive state,  only connections
from the word unit to the motivation unit of its
non-word procedure can be activated (from top
to bottom in figure  7), whereas in the Report
state only the opposite connections can be ac-
tivated. As can be seen in figure  7, Word-nets
can  not  only  be  connected  with  motivation
units  of  the  sensorimotor  nets,  but  also  with
motivation units that do not directly control a
sensorimotor element (e.g., Walk, Outbound).
What might be the function of this exten-
sion by Word-nets? In the Perceive state (or re-
act state), a perceived word, uttered by another
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Figure 5: The body-model and its relation to the body of robot Hector (a). (b) shows the vectors forming the central
body (left) and the vectors forming one leg model (right). The central model and the leg-models are connected via the
shared “leg vector” (white arrows) that point from the hip to the tip of the leg (shown here for the left front leg only).
Walking direction and velocity are controlled by the input vectors pull_fw (forward) or pull_bw (backward) provided
by sensory input.
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agent, will activate, via its word unit, its part-
ner’s motivation unit, and thereby possibly in-
fluence behavior  (depending on the actual  in-
ternal state of the system and on the strength
of the word input). When in the Report state,
the actually active motivation units will in turn
activate their corresponding word units, which
may  lead  to  an  uttering  of  a  word.  As,  of
course,  only  one  word  can  be  activated  at  a
given time, some kind of decision network (e.g.,
a WTA net) is required, though, for reasons of
simplicity, not shown in figure  7. In any case,
introduction of Word-nets allows for a very ba-
sic  form of  communication between the agent
and  any  other  partner,  communication  being
limited to “one-word sentences”. 
As indicated on the left  side of  figure  7
(units “front”, “left”), further motivation units
might be introduced into the network that do
not have a direct function within, in this case,
the Walknet controller.  Of course,  these units
may be connected to word units. (Note that we
do not deal with the question how these units
may be connected within the network through
training).
This  architecture  combines  sensorimotor
procedures  with  Word-nets  (which  by  them-
selves  represent  specific  sensorimotor  proced-
ures). Together, they form a simple case of se-
mantic  memory,  because  procedural  memory
representing an action (e.g., Swing-net) is con-
nected  with  a  memory  element  representing
verbal symbols. 
To illustrate the versatility of this archi-
tecture, we will briefly address how it can also
be  applied  in  order  to  embrace  perceptual
memory.  Following  ideas  of  O’Connor et al.
(2009),  Cruse &  Schilling (2010a) have shown
how an RNN, using the same elements as ap-
plied  here  for  the  motivation  unit  network,
could  be  used  to  construct  a  perceptual
memory. This network does not only allow the
representation of  directly  perceived  perceptual
elements (e.g., the colour or shape of an object),
but also of superordinate concepts (e.g.,  Cow,
Animal,  four-legged).  Note  that  “four-legged”
might also be a feature of non-animals, e.g., a
table. Therefore, the ability of our network to
deal with heterarchical structures is advantage-
ous  for  perceptual  memory,  too.  Elements  of
such a distributed memory can also be connec-
ted to specific  Word-nets  (e.g.,  “red”,  “Cow”,
“animal”), as has been explained above for the
sensorimotor motivation units. Correspondingly,
activation of one memory element of this per-
ceptual memory may elicit the uttering of the
corresponding word, and, in turn, when in Per-
ceive mode, the hearing of a word may activate
various elements of the procedural memory that
are associated with this word.
6 ReaCog: Emergent properties 
characterized by applying other levels 
of description 
To summarise,  the  neural  controller  Walknet,
(for details see Dürr et al. 2004; Schilling et al.
2013a) is an embodied control system (first-or-
der  embodiment,  cf.  Metzinger (2006,  2014).
The reactive system can deal with varying un-
predictable environments.  It  relies only on in-
formation  that  is  available  to  the  given
mechanosensors, which is possible because both
body and environment are integral to the over-
all computational system. In this way, the sys-
tem is embodied. Of course, the system has a
physical body, but even more, being embodied
means that properties of the body (like its geo-
metry)  are  exploited  in  computations  of  the
controller. Using its own body as part of a loop
through the world allows for dramatically sim-
plifying  computations  (Schmitz et  al. 2008).
These properties are of course also present in
the expanded version, reaCog. Even though in
reaCog an internal body-model is introduced in
order  to  control  the  high  number  of  DoFs,
reaCog still relies heavily on the cooperation of
individual parts, i.e., the combination of coup-
lings  between body,  environment,  the internal
body model, and the controller itself. In addi-
tion, this internal model of its own body is used
for planning ahead. Such a network, following
Metzinger (2006, 2014) represents a system that
is characterized by second-order embodiment. 
As shown in figure 2, the procedures form-
ing the decentralized controller are basically ar-
ranged in parallel, i.e., each procedure obtains
its  own sensory input and provides  a  specific
Cruse, H. & Schilling, M. (2015). Mental States as Emergent Properties - From Walking to Consciousness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 9(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570436 12 | 38
www.open-mind.net
motor output. But procedures can also receive
input  from other  procedures  and  can provide
output directly to other procedures. This relat-
ively flat, heterarchical structure is also applied
by  the  Word-nets  and  in  perceptual  memory
(Cruse & Schilling 2010a).
ReaCog  automatically  selects  actions  on
the lower reactive level. Several of these proced-
ures can be performed in parallel. On the cog-
nitive  level,  decisions  about  which  action  to
choose are not based solely on sensory input,
but are chosen depending on the imagined ac-
tion,  since  there  is  a  stochastic  effect  due  to
noise in the attention controller. The decision is
afterwards tested by internal simulation before
it is applied to the real system, and only after
successful  execution  is  the  proposed  behavior
stored in long-term memory. Therefore, this de-
cision process can be envisioned as a Darwinian
type  of  selection  that  begins  from  stochastic
“mutations” that are then tested for “fitness”
and selected based on this fitness. Thus, reaCog
is a minimally cognitive system in the sense of
the  definition  given  by  McFarland &  Bösser
(1993).
After we have defined the control network
quantitatively,  we  can  use  reaCog  to  analyze
emergent properties, which haven’t been imple-
mented  explicitly.  As  an  example  we  have
already  considered  a  term  like  “tripod  gait”
that is sensible on a behavioral level in order to
describe  the  emergent  overall  behavior  of  the
walker. But on the control level there is no ex-
plicit tripod gait controller in reaCog (Schilling
et al. 2008; Schilling et al. 2013a). The local in-
fluences coupling neighboring legs are respons-
ible  for  overall  coordinated  walking  behavior
(different  from  many  other  hexapod  control-
lers),  and  different  gaits  can  emerge  just  by
choosing  different  velocities.  Therefore,  appar-
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Figure 6: The controller of the reactive system as depicted in figure 2 expanded by a WTA-net (green units, not all
connections are shown). Each WTA unit shows a bi-directional connection to a unit of the motivation unit network.
This architecture provides the basis of reaCog, as explained in the main text. (for further explanations see figure 2). 
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ent  “gaits”  or  the observation that  “cognitive
maps”  are  required  can  be  seen  an  emergent
property of such a network.
In the following, we will turn to concepts
that are usually applied in fields different from
computer science or behavioral biology, like psy-
chology and philosophy of mind. Choosing an-
other level of description can help us gain a bet-
ter understanding of the system on a more ab-
stract level. In addition, this approach can lead
to  more  operational  definitions  for  concepts
used in other disciplines. This is based on the
assumption that many of the above-mentioned
phenomena emerge (Vision 2011) and that they
can be used as concepts only on a higher, more
abstract level. 
For some authors, consciousness is thought
to be restricted to human beings. In contrast,
other authors share the opinion that there are
degrees of consciousness and that consciousness
does occur, to a smaller degree, in lower-level
animals  (Dennett 1991).  Showing  that  quite
small and simplistic networks can allow for in-
teresting cognitive properties (Chittka & Niven
2009; Menzel et al. 2007) supports such a view,
as it provides a plausible evolutionary explana-
tion for consciousness (or better degrees of con-
sciousness).  Agreeing  with  this  basic  assump-
tion,  we want  to analyze  to  what extent  our
simple control network fulfils certain aspects of
consciousness or emotions, even though we did
not intend to realize this in our system in the
beginning. The graded emergence of such high-
level concepts would offer  an evolutionary ac-
count and might allow us to address questions
on the function, e.g., of consciousness, and ex-
plain how it relates to the control of behavior.
7 Phenomenality 
Before  concentrating  on  specific  phenomena,
such  as  emotions  or  consciousness,  we  would
like to address a more fundamental aspect that
appears to be relevant for all higher-level phe-
nomena,  namely  the  occurrence  of  subjective
experience.
An  example  of  subjective  experience  is
pain. Even though it might be possible for us to
closely attend to all neuronal activities of a hu-
man test subject while stimulating that person’s
skin with a needle, the observed data would be
different  from the  experienced  pain,  which  is
only  felt  by  that  person.  Nobody other  than
that person can feel the pain. This form of ex-
periencing  an  internal  perspective  is  therefore
only  accessible  to  us  through self-observation.
Intuitively, other systems—like non-living things
or simple machines—lack such an internal per-
spective. But in many cases, like for animals, it
is hard to determine whether they have subject-
ive experience or are merely reflexive machines
that do not possess an internal perspective.
This problem is also visible when we con-
sider a human brain, in the contrasting states of
being  awake or  asleep,  for  example.  While  in
(dreamless) sleep or under anesthesia the same
neuronal systems as in a wakeful state may be
active, subjective experience is assumed not to
be present. And even in a normal wakeful state,
we are not aware of all the contents of the dif-
ferent neuronal activities that take place in our
brain. Therefore, only a specific type of neur-
onal activity seems to be accompanied by sub-
jective experience. 
There is only indirect evidence on the con-
ditions required for subjective experience. Libet
et  al. (1964)  performed  an  early  experiment,
where the cortex of a human subject was dir-
ectly stimulated, electronically. Only for stimuli
longer than 500 ms did the subjects report a
subjective experience. Bloch’s law (Bloch 1885)
formulates this connection more generally. The
subjectively-experienced strength of a stimulus
depends on the mathematical product of stimu-
lus  duration  and  stimulus  intensity.  In  other
words, a stimulus is only experienced subject-
ively  when  the  temporally-integrated  stimulus
intensity surpasses a given threshold.
More recent experiments have studied the
concurrent  activation  of  different  procedures
that compete for becoming subjectively experi-
enced. A basic experiment has been performed
by  Fehrer &  Raab (1962),  and  has  been  fol-
lowed  by  detailed  later  studies  (Neumann &
Klotz 1994). First, participants learned to press
a button whenever  a  square  was  shown on a
screen, but not when two squares were shown in
a  position  on  the  screen  flanking  the  first
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square. After the learning period was over, in
the experiment the single square was presented
for only a short period (about 30 ms), which
was then followed by a longer presentation of
the two squares. The participants did not report
having seen the single square, but reported only
having seen the two squares. Nonetheless, they
pressed the button. This result shows, first, that
the first procedure A (“stimulus single square-
motor response”), can be executed without be-
ing  accompanied  by  subjective  experience  of
stimulus stimA, the single square. Second, pro-
cedure B (“stimulus double squares—no motor
response”)  appears  to  influence  how the  first
procedure is experienced, i.e., this procedure in-
hibits  the  subjective  experience  of  stimulus
stimA. Therefore, stimulus stimA is not subject-
ively  experienced  (the  “masking”  effect),  but
nonetheless triggers the motor reaction.
This situation can be interpreted in the
following way (Figure  8,  left).  On the  input
side, each procedure shows temporal dynamics
that  are  similar  to  that  of  a  low-pass  filter
(LPF) (see footnote on page 2) followed by an
integrator  (IntA,  IntB).6 Stimulation  of  one
procedure  inhibits  the  representation  of  the
other procedure for some limited time (figure
8,  Δt).  In  addition,  both  integrators  are
coupled via mutual inhibition (in figure 8 de-
picted by separate units). In the masking ex-
periment, the first stimulus (stimA) does not
inhibit the second procedure (B), because the
latter is not yet stimulated, as long as stimu-
lus  stimA  is  active.  In  contrast,  when  the
second stimulus,  stimB,  is  given,  the  repres-
entation  of  procedure  A may be  suppressed.
The representation of the input given by units
IntA and IntB activate the corresponding mo-
tivation units (MU) of the procedures, MUA
and  MUB,  respectively.  This  could  be  ex-
plained if we assume two different thresholds.
First, the motor command of a procedure can
be elicited when a small threshold (thr1, fig-
ure  8)  is  reached.  But,  a  second,  larger
threshold (thr2, figure  8) must be reached in
order to have subjective experience. Then, in
our paradigm, procedure A, which was activ-
6 An integrator performs a mathematical integration, i.e., it sums the
input over time.
ated first, may reach the level of thr1, which
is sufficient to activate the motor output, but
not thr2. Only the second procedure, B, has
enough time to reach the state of  subjective
experience (thr2, figure 8, right), which allows
the double square (stimB) to become subject-
ively experienced (however this comes about).
The model therefore suffices to explain the ba-
sic  properties  characterizing  the  backward-
masking  experiment.  As  has  been  shown  by
Cruse & Schilling (2014), the structure depic-
ted in figure  8 can also deal with a forward-
masking  paradigm,  the  so-called  attentional
blink effect  (Schneider 2013).  To further  de-
scribe  another  experiment,  showing  the  so
called  psychological  refractory  period  (PRP)
paradigm  (e.g.,  Zylberberg et  al. 2011),  the
motivation  units  (MUA, MUB) of  procedure
A and procedure  B are connected in  such a
way as to inhibit each other. In other words,
the motivation units of these procedures form
a WTA network. In addition, each procedure
inhibits its own motivation unit  after its ac-
tion has been completed. 
From these observations we conclude that
there are specific  neuronal  states  that require
time to be developed. While eliciting an output
signal (like a motor command) is the basic func-
tion of the system, this can happen without ac-
companying subjective experiences.  Only some
procedures  may give  rise  to  such phenomenal
experience and might, in addition, trigger sub-
sequent functions in the neural system. For ex-
ample,  this  procedure  may  be  able  to  access
more neuronal sources and perhaps allow faster
storing  of  new information  (e.g.,  for  one-shot
learning). In addition to such functional proper-
ties the network can endorse the (mental) prop-
erty of showing subjective experience, i.e.,  en-
tering the phenomenal state.
The  experimental  findings  mentioned
above support  a  non-dualist,  or  monist,  view,
which  means  that  there  are  no  separate  do-
mains (or “substances”), such as the mental and
the physical domain, in the sense that there are
causal influences from one domain to the other
one as postulated by substance dualism. Rather,
the impression of there being two “domains”—
often characterized as being separated by an ex-
Cruse, H. & Schilling, M. (2015). Mental States as Emergent Properties - From Walking to Consciousness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 9(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570436 15 | 38
www.open-mind.net
planatory gap (Levine 1983)—, results from us-
ing different levels of descriptions.7
An explanation of the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of  neural networks that allow
for subjective experience would be extremely in-
teresting.  Even  though  there  currently  exist
only early insights or mere speculations, there
has been a lot of progress during the past few
years (review Schier 2009; Dehaene & Changeux
2011). The continuation of these research pro-
jects will hopefully yield a more detailed under-
standing. Using combinations of neurophysiolo-
gical and behavioral studies may lead a better
understanding  of  the  physiological  properties
and functions of this state. It is, however, gener-
ally assumed that even if we knew the physical
details at some future time, we would not un-
derstand why this state, which is characterized
by physical properties, is accompanied by phe-
nomenal  experience.  Here  we propose  another
view.  We  assume  that  this  problem  will  be
“solved” such that the question concerning the
explanatory gap will  simply disappear,  as has
happened in the case of explaining the occur-
rence of life. Concerning the latter, there was an
intensive debate between Vitalists and Mechan-
ists at the beginning of the last century on how
non-living matter could be transformed into liv-
ing matter. The Vitalists argued that a special,
unknown force, termed vis vitalis, was required.
After many decades of intensive research, we are
in a position where an internal model is avail-
able,  which  represents  the  observation  that  a
specific collection and arrangement of molecules
is endowed with the property of living. This and
similar cases may be generalized as the follow-
ing rule:  If  we have enough information, such
that we can develop an internal model of the
phenomena under examination, and if it is suffi-
ciently detailed to allow the prediction of  the
properties of the system, we have the impres-
sion  of  having understood the system.  In the
case of life, indeed we do not need a vis vitalis
any longer, but consider liveliness an emergent
property.  Correspondingly,  we  propose  that  if
7 There are various views adopting a monist approach, that differ in
detail (epiphenomenalism, emergentism, property dualism and their
many derivatives, see  Vision 2011). We will not enter into this dis-
cussion here.
we knew the functional details and conditions
that lead to matter having subjective experience
well enough, so that the appearance of subject-
ive experience can be predicted, we would have
the impression of having understood the prob-
lem. Therefore, we assume that the question of
the  explanatory  gap  will  disappear  at  some
point, as was the case in the example of life.
Adopting a monist view allows us to con-
centrate on the functional aspects when trying
to compare systems endowed with the phenom-
enality, i.e., human beings, with animals or arti-
ficial systems. According to this view, phenom-
enality is considered a property that is directly
connected  with  specific  functions  of  the  net-
work. This means that mental phenomena that
are characterized by phenomenal properties—as
are, for example, attention, intention, volition,
emotion,  and consciousness—can be  examined
by concentrating on the aspect of information
processing (Neisser 1967).
To  avoid  possible  misunderstandings,  we
want to stress that we do not mean that the
phenomenal aspect does not have any function
in the sense that the system would work in the
same  way  if  there  was  no  such  phenomenal
properties.  Since,  according  to  our  view,  the
phenomenality  necessarily  arises  with  such  a
system, a version of such a system showing ex-
actly  the  same  functions  but  not  having  the
phenomenal  aspect  would  not  be  possible.  A
change in the phenomenal properties of a sys-
tem has to be accompanied by a change in its
functional  properties.  Functional  and phenom-
enal aspects are two sides of one coin. However,
remaining on the functional side makes the dis-
cussion much easier.
To summarize, the content of any memory
element  may  be  subjectively  experienced  (or
available to conscious awareness) if (1) the (un-
known) neuronal structures that allow for the
neural  dynamics  required  for  the  phenomenal
aspect to occur are given, and (2) the strength
and duration of the activation of the memory
element is large enough, provided the element is
not inhibited by competing elements. 
The question of how any system can pos-
sibly  have  subjective  experience  was  famously
called the “hard problem” by Chalmers (1997).
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Adopting a monist view, we can avoid this ques-
tion and leave it open, as we are interested in
understanding  the  functional  aspects  of  con-
sciousness (on the ethical implications of an ar-
tificial system having subjective experience im-
plemented in  appropriate neural  dynamics see
Metzinger 2009, 2013). Regarding what kind of
dynamics could be thought of, it has been spec-
ulated that subjective experience might occur in
a  recurrent  neural  network  that  is  equipped
with attractor properties. Following this hypo-
thesis, subjective experience would occur if such
a network approached its attractor state (Cruse
2003). This  assumption would mean that  any
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Figure  7:  The reactive network expanded by a layer containing procedures that represent words (Word-net, upper
row). The motivation unit of a Word-net (WU) is bi-directionally connected (dashed double-headed arrows) with the
corresponding motivation unit of the reactive system containing procedural elements of Walknet (left, see figure 2) and
of Navinet (right, see figure 4). The word stored in a Word-net is indicated as (“ ... ”). Not all of these motivation units
have to be connected with a Word-net.
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system showing an attractor might be endowed
with the phenomenon of subjective experience.
It may, however, not have all the other proper-
ties characterizing consciousness. On the other
hand, there might be systems in which the func-
tional aspects currently attributed to conscious-
ness are fulfilled, but where there is no subject-
ive experience present.  This case would imply
that our list representing the functions of con-
sciousness as given in section  10 below is not
yet complete. 
In  the  following  two  sections  we  shall
briefly  treat  two  phenomena—emotions  and
consciousness—and discuss how they might be
related  to  the  minimally-cognitive  system  as
represented by reaCog.
8 Emotions 
Most authors generally agree that emotions are
accompanied by subjective experience and that
they have the function of helping the subject re-
spond adaptively to environmental pressures. So
there is the phenomenal aspect of emotions as
well as a functional aspect. As we have already
treated the phenomenal aspect above, here we
will put aside this aspect, i.e., how it feels to be
happy, sad, etc., and concentrate on the func-
tional aspect of emotions.
Even  though  several  authors  assume  or
even demand that emotions are already present
in simple reactive systems,  and that they are
necessary  for  a  cognitive  system  (Valdez &
Mehrabian 1994),  in  our  above  description  of
the properties of the network reaCog, any emo-
tional aspects have not been taken into account.
We did not require the term “emotions” to ex-
plain our approach, nor have we built  in any
kind of explicit emotional system. However, we
will  argue  that  there  are  emerging  properties
that are comparable to what is usually ascribed
to properties of emotional systems. In the fol-
lowing, we want to focus on which parts in our
system take this role and how the functions of
these parts can be described and related to at-
tributes of emotional systems. 
The  attempt  to  relate  the  properties  of
our network with the concept of emotions ap-
pears not very promising at first sight, because
a series of interrelated conceptual terms such as
emotions,  attitudes,  motivations,  sentiments,
moods, drives, and feelings can be found in the
literature,  and  are  defined  in  different  but
partly  overlapping  ways  by  different  authors
(Pérez et al. 2012). The reason for this disagree-
ment might be that there are indeed no clearly
separable mechanisms underlying these phenom-
ena but rather  we are dealing with a holistic
system, which makes separation into clear-cut
concepts  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  As  men-
tioned,  the  problem of  being  confronted  with
heterarchical structures appeared when looking
at the reactive level (and reappeared later when
dealing with perceptual memory), which led us
to  the  neutral  term “motivation  unit“  for  all
“levels” of the heterarchy formed by the motiva-
tion unit network. To simplify matters, we will
only deal with the term emotions in the follow-
ing.
What might be possible functions of emo-
tions? As follows from the examples of overlap-
ping conceptual approaches found in the literat-
ure and mentioned below, emotions are attrib-
uted to various functions characterized by dif-
ferent levels of complexity. These range from en-
abling the agent to select  sensory input (e.g.,
tunnel  vision,  Pérez et  al. 2012) and activate
different procedures, or, at a higher level, to se-
lect between different behavioral demands (e.g.,
hunger – thirst, flight – fight, Parisi & Petrosino
2010) up to more abstract states such as suffer-
ing from sadness or being in a state of happi-
ness and controlling the corresponding behavi-
ors  (e.g.,  Ekman 1999).  The  lower-level  de-
cisions are well covered by our motivation unit
network, and form a heterarchical system show-
ing  attractor  states  (e.g.,  swing  –  stance,  In-
bound – Outbound). These states allow for se-
lection of sensory input and/or motor proced-
ures  that  are  stimulated  by  sensory  input  to
specific motivation units.  In the following, we
therefore focus on higher-level states, such as,
for  example,  emotions,  as  listed  by  Ekman
(1999).
In  general,  and  as  discussed  below,  one
can distinguish between prototypical approaches
and reductionist approaches—the latter simpli-
fying emotions down to just a few basic dimen-
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sions. In current research, both views appear to
be  justified  as  they  both  try  to  describe  the
phenomena observed, though at different levels
of description.
Following the first approach, research tries
to trace emotions back to a set of basic emo-
tions, the combination of which can explain fur-
ther derived emotions. This approach has been
advocated by  Plutchik (1980). A problem with
such  an  approach  is  how  to  draw  borders
between emotions and what counts as a basic
emotion. Ekman (1999) proposed a list of char-
acteristics  of  similarity  between emotions  and
came up with a set of  fifteen basic emotions.
Later on, based on their relation to facial ex-
pressions, he reduced this number to six. This
set, which is now widely used as the basic set of
emotions in many different contexts, consists of
happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and sur-
prise. As an example, let us consider happiness.
Happiness is elicited when we are in a state of
having had or expecting positive situations. The
behavioral effect of happiness might be charac-
terized as being open to new ideas, perhaps not
being too critical and open to performing new,
unconventional  behaviors.  How  might  such  a
phenomenon be represented in reaCog? First of
all, a neuronal state of the motivation network
would correspond to a specific emotion. Such a
network state is usually triggered by some sens-
ory stimulus eliciting an emotion. This stimulus
activates  specific,  basically  innate,  networks
which,  when active,  influence  the  system and
put it into the respective emotional state. Such
a network—which could,  in  the most  reduced
case, consist of just one neuronal unit—has not
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Figure 8: (a) A hypothetical network that is capable of dealing with some dual task experiments, for example the
backward masking experiment. Stimulation of one of the procedures, A or B, activates a low-pass filter (LPFA, LPFB)
followed by an integrator (IntA, IntB) and inhibits the corresponding units of the other procedure for a limited time
(Δt). The integrators are coupled via mutual inhibition. After activation of one of the integrator units has reached
threshold thr1 (lower dashed line), the corresponding motor motivation unit (MuA or MuB), coupled via mutual inhibi-
tion, is activated, which drives the behavior. If threshold thr2 (upper dashed line) is reached, the stimulus can be phe-
nomenally experienced. A feedback from the procedure can provide an “end” signal to inhibit its own motivation unit.
(b) Temporal development of the activation of some units (procedure A, blue, procedure B, red). Abscissa is relative
time. If stimB follows briefly after stimA, the unit IntA may reach its motor threshold thr1, but not the threshold thr2
for eliciting the phenomenal experience. In contrast, stimB elicits both the motor output and the phenomenal experi -
ence that corresponds to the backward masking effect (for details see Cruse & Schilling 2014).
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been introduced in reaCog, but if  assumed as
given, it may modulate meta-control parameters
such as, for example, noise levels, thresholds, or
learning  rates  (Doya 2000,  2002).  To stick  to
our example of “happiness”, activation of such a
network,  which  represents  stimulus  situations
considered to elicit this state may, within the
Spreading Activation Layer, lead to a faster dif-
fusion process,  perhaps supported by stronger
noise amplitude. Such a broadening of the at-
tention range as a consequence of positive af-
fects has been reported by Dreisbach & Goschke
(2004).  In  addition,  or  as  an  alternative,  the
threshold  for  the  problem  detectors  that  we
mentioned in section 4 might be increased. As a
consequence, the system would take more risks.
All these changes would lead to an increase in
“creativity”, i.e.,  the ability to find new ideas
for possible solutions. Corresponding structures
might be found in the other basic emotions lis-
ted by Ekman.
In the second group of approaches to char-
acterizing the emotions, emotions are described
through a set of dimensions that represent the
emotional  state.  We  will  briefly  sketch  this
seemingly alternative reductionist approach and
will again draw parallels with reaCog. The con-
nection to reaCog is made on a different level
and is therefore not logically exclusive with re-
spect  to  the  former.  Wundt (1863)  was  quite
opposed to the idea of breaking down emotions
into a set of basic emotions that serve as proto-
types, mainly because he assumed that a set of
emotions  is  better  described  by  a  continuum
than by separable  categories.  This  follows  his
idea  of  describing  emotions  through  principal
components leading to dimensional systems, like
the  pleasure-arousal-dominance  (PAD)  frame-
work (Mehrabian 1996). In the PAD framework,
three  dimensions  span  the  space  of  the  emo-
tions. The first describes the state pleasure–dis-
pleasure and corresponds to the affective state
(excited – relaxed). Arousal, as the second di-
mension, represents the level of mental alertness
and physical activity (tense – sleepy). The third
axis  describes  the  level  of  dominance–sub-
missiveness, i.e., the feeling of being in control.
The three factors of the PAD framework have
successfully been employed as semantic differen-
tial factors to describe emotional states in dif-
ferent contexts, e.g., for describing postures, fa-
cial expressions, gestures, and vocal expression.
The three dimensions appear to be sufficient as
they capture large parts of the variance (Mehra-
bian 1996).  Mehrabian  has  related  the  three
traits—pleasure,  arousal  and  dominance—to
specific cognitive characteristics. First, pleasure-
displeasure, according to Mehrabian, deals with
the fulfillment of expectations. Fulfillment of an
expectation  (or  not)  occurs  when,  during  a
problematic situation, planning ahead is activ-
ated and after some time and searching a solu-
tion  is  found  (or  not)—a  state  that  can  be
found in reaCog, too. But fulfillment of expect-
ation might also occur at lower levels, when, for
example, a simple procedure such as Swingnet
is equipped with a target value and this goal is
either  reached or  not.  The error  signal  might
then be used as a measure for fulfillment of ex-
pectation.  For  example,  it  might  be  used  as
problem detector in the case mentioned earlier,
when a subject tries to lift a leg off the ground,
but  due  to  an  inconvenient  load  distribution,
the body falls down and the leg remains in con-
tact with the substrate. The arousability trait,
as introduced by Mehrabian (1996), was meant
to incorporate the process of “stimulus screen-
ing”. In short, “stimulus screening” is a process
of attentional focusing. Such a process of focus-
ing attention occurs in our system, too, as, on
the  one  end  of  the  spectrum,  the  system
broadly attends to all environmental influences
as  perceived  through  its  sensors,  and  this  is
characterized as its being in the “reactive state”.
At the other extreme, when a specific problem-
atic situation occurs, it is necessary to focus at-
tention and to guide the search for a solution
towards specific modalities, parts of the body,
etc. But even on the reactive level, attention se-
lection  can  be  observed,  as  we  mentioned
earlier. Finally,  the dominance trait (“general-
ized expectations of control”  Mehrabian 1996)
concerns  the extent  to  which the  agent  takes
over in the actual situation and is not only re-
sponding and reacting,  which agrees  with the
main thesis of our approach, namely that it is
possible  to  switch  between the  reactive  mode
and  the  cognitive  mode.  Similarly,  Russell &
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Norvig (2003)  have  required  an  autonomous
agent to be able to both react to known situ-
ations and to be in control of the situation itself
(or as Russell and Norvig call it: being proact-
ive). 
Our approach, as we have mentioned, does
not aim to build specific emotional properties,
but tries to build a functional autonomous sys-
tem and then to look at the aspects  of  emo-
tional  properties  that  might  be  found  in  the
network or gained after some further functional
expansion  of  the network.  We have listed ex-
amples  from  different  levels  of  description  in
psychology  and point  to  related  properties  in
our network. We are not arguing that reaCog
has emotions (we are in any case agnostic with
respect  to  the  subjective  aspect).  Rather,  we
claim that by taking a network like reaCog as a
scaffold,  different  conceptualizations  of  the
functional aspects of emotions can be mapped
onto such a quantitatively defined system and
thus be considered emergent properties.
It might be added here that recent studies
support the idea that emotion-like states do in-
deed occur in brains which are by far less com-
plex than mammalian brains. Yang et al. (2014)
could show that the concept of “learned uncon-
trollability”, generally considered as an animal
model  for  depression  as  observed  in  humans,
can  be  found  in  Drosophila,  too.  For  verteb-
rates, it is known that stress induces the state
of fear or of anxiety, the latter being considered
as a second order emotion. Fossat et al. (2014)
could show that a crayfish treated by stressors
(i) avoids illuminated parts of the environment
and (b) shows an increased level of serotonin in
the brain, as can be observed in vertebrates. As
in vertebrates, the state of anxiety could be re-
lieved by application of anxiolytic drugs. Both
results have been interpreted such that the abil-
ity to adopt emotional states must have been
evolved before the separation of the arthropods
and vertebrates.
9 Attention, volition and intention 
In the following section we want to turn to at-
tention, intention, and volition. To what degree
can those properties be attributed to our sys-
tem? We start from the definitions of attention
provided by Desimone & Duncan (1995), of in-
tention  from  Pacherie (2006)  and  Goschke
(2013), and of volition from Goschke (2013).
Attention is the ongoing selection process
in perception. It can be driven bottom-up, i.e.,
by sensory influences, or it can be controlled by
top-down  influences  (Desimone &  Duncan
1995).  Top-down driving  of  attention depends
on the internal or emotional state and might de-
pend on familiarity with the stimulus. 
We can indeed find properties correspond-
ing to attention in reaCog. The motivation net-
work  is  constituted  of  local  clusters  of  units
that  always  compete  on  this  local  level  and
form in this way coalitions of units and small
subclusters. As an example, we introduced the
selection of procedures at the leg level. Either a
swing or a stance motivation unit can be active
and  inhibits  the  other  one.  These  two  units
compete for control of behavior. Sensory units
can influence this competition. For example, an
incoming  ground-contact  signal  ends  a  swing
movement and initiates stance activation. After
activating the “Stance” unit only sensory input
relevant to stance can be perceived by the sys-
tem, but not inputs relevant to swing. There-
fore, this case corresponds to bottom-up atten-
tion control.
Such competition can also be found on a
global level, on which different behaviors can be
chosen. The activation of these higher-level ele-
ments influences the lower level. This activation
provides  a  context  for  the  lower  level,  which
guides the selection process on that level and
decides which sensory inputs might be relevant.
Thereby, more global clusters control the atten-
tion on the lower levels in a top-down fashion.
Corresponding examples can be found in Nav-
inet,  which we mentioned earlier.  Only  visual
signals concerning landmarks that belong to the
current  active  context  are  considered  and
switching between contexts only becomes pos-
sible  after  the  food source  has  been  depleted
and found empty.
The cognitive expansion of reaCog repres-
ents  another  case  of  top-down influence.  This
system  comes  up  with  new  behaviors  and
probes them via internal  simulation.  As men-
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tioned, there is a specific WTA layer that mir-
rors the arrangement of the lower motor control
layer (figure  6, green units).  This part of the
controller can be called an “attention control-
ler”, as the explicit function of this layer is to
narrow down the search  for  suitable  behavior
and to actively select a single one. We call this
selection a cognitive decision, as the system is
supposed to select a behavior that would not
normally  be  triggered  through the  given  con-
text. In this way the system represents a special
type of top-down attention. The focusing mech-
anism may correspond to what sometimes has
been  termed  “spot  light”  (Baars &  Franklin
2007 p. 955). Overall, we can therefore observe
three different types of attentional influences in
reaCog.
Volition  is  an  umbrella  term  denoting
mechanisms allowing for voluntary actions. The
latter are “actions that are not fully determined
by the immediate stimulus situation but depend
on mental representations of intended goals and
anticipated effects” (Goschke 2013). For an out-
side observer, voluntary actions cannot be pre-
dicted. As mentioned above, it is crucial for the
cognitive expansion that it can select behaviors
that are not triggered by the current situation.
The system has to invent new behaviors. Even
though the consequences of these behaviors are
predicted,  from the outside the finally  chosen
behavior  is  not  predictable,  as  this  invention
and selection of new behaviors is stochastic to
some extent. The application of internal simula-
tion only guarantees that the proposed behavior
will lead to a solution, but it does not give away
which behavior will be chosen. To the contrary,
the search space of possible solutions can easily
become  very  large  and  has  to  be  restricted.
Such restrictions help to span a tractable space
of  possible  solutions.  In  our  example,  reaCog
looks  first  for  solutions  in  the  morphological
neighborhood, i.e., it tries to use the neighbor-
ing legs  to help find a solution for a  locally-
given problem. There are still many possible be-
haviors that must be tested in a somewhat ran-
dom order.  The system will  end up with one
that has been anticipated as a solution in in-
ternal simulation, but this solution is not selec-
ted through sensory inputs or the current con-
text as such. Therefore, volition may be attrib-
uted to a system like reaCog.
Does an agent controlled by reaCog show
intentions? Intentions are present when the con-
trolled action is goal-directed. We are following
Pacherie (2006), who proposes a differentiation
of three types of intentions (based on Bratman’s
(1987)  original  differentiation  into  two  such
types). Pacherie distinguishes future-directed as
well  as  present-directed  intentions  and  intro-
duces motor-intentions as a third type. Present-
directed intentions are considered to be under
“conscious” (or “rational”) control. In contrast,
motor intentions are related to lower-level func-
tion (Pacherie 2006). Defining for these types of
intention is that they provide guidance for the
function on the respective level. In reaCog, mo-
tor-intentions are realized by the fact that, on
the reactive-control level, behaviors can be se-
lected based on the context. Present-directed in-
tentions can be found on the level of cognitive
decision.  Future-directed  intensions  are  not
treated by reaCog, because its architecture in
the current version only allows for dealing with
problems that occur in the context of current
walking  behavior.  However,  an  expansion  of
reaCog that would include planning ahead using
Navinet as a substrate would include future-dir-
ected intensions, too.
Goschke (2013)  defines  intentions  as
“causal preconditions explaining why a particu-
lar stimulus triggers a particular action (rather
than  a  different  action)”  (Goschke 2013,  p.
415). In other words, “intentions can be said to
shape the “attractor  landscape” of  an agent’s
behavioral state space” (Kugler et al. 1990, ref.
from Goschke 2013, p. 415). In reaCog, such an
attractor landscape is described by the motiva-
tion unit network. As explained in the preced-
ing paragraph on attention, the activation of a
context guides, in a top-down fashion, both the
selection of a suitable behavior as well as which
sensory inputs the system should attend to. The
lower-level activation and incoming sensory in-
puts influence, on the one hand, the adaptive
execution of the behavior as such. On the other
hand, the sensory input can inform the higher
level in bottom-up fashion and might indirectly
trigger changes on this higher-level, too. The ac-
Cruse, H. & Schilling, M. (2015). Mental States as Emergent Properties - From Walking to Consciousness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 9(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570436 22 | 38
www.open-mind.net
tivation on the higher level will, however, be in
general more stable on a temporal scale and will
reflect a specific context as well as relate to spe-
cific goals. For example, in the case of Navinet,
there are different possible goals, such as food
sources or the nest, which are represented in the
higher-level network. Selecting one of these as a
goal will guide the overall function of the sys-
tem,  as  its  behavior  is  directed  towards  ap-
proaching that location, while the sensory sys-
tem will attend only to the specific (expected)
sensory stimuli.  Therefore,  reaCog can be  as-
sumed to show goal-directed behavior and in-
tentions.
10 Consciousness 
In this section we would like to discuss to what
extent  properties  of  consciousness  might  be
found in our system. Even though we start from
a common notion of how consciousness can be
viewed as consisting of separable domains, we
are  well  aware  that  this  approach  is  not  the
only or ultimate solution for approaching this
question.  But  such  a  differentiation  appears
well-suited for our bottom-up approach. 
Overall,  many  authors  contribute  to  the
view in which consciousness is broken down into
a set of properties. We start from a review by
Cleeremans (2005), who gives a good overview
on the diverse philosophical views on conscious-
ness and tries to integrate them into one frame-
work.  While  there  is  disagreement  in  general
and also on the details (see also  Vision 2011),
Cleeremans  interestingly  finds  a  common  de-
nominator between the different opinions that
characterize possible computational correlates of
consciousness. He introduced a differentiation of
consciousness  into  three  domains:  phenomenal
consciousness,  access  consciousness,  and meta-
cognition (or in other contexts referred to as re-
flexive consciousness). There is disagreement on
the  phenomenal  aspect,  as  it  is  seen  by  one
group of philosophers to be an independent do-
main. In contrast, there is also a view in which
phenomenality cannot be separated from meta-
cognition and access consciousness, but must be
seen in relation to those (see review Cleeremans
2005).
We have argued in section 7, that the phe-
nomenal  aspect  as  such,  i.e.,  the  property  of
some  neuronal  structures  that  are  equipped
with subjective experience, has  per se no func-
tion, but is, nonetheless, not separable from the
functional properties. Therefore, we see the phe-
nomenal aspect not as a separate type of con-
sciousness, but as a property of both access con-
sciousness  and  metacognition.  This  view  has
convincingly been supported by  Kouider et al.
(2010) as well as, in a recent review, by Cohen
&  Dennett (2011). Therefore, we will compare
properties  of  reaCog  with  current  definitions
found in the literature concerning the phenom-
ena of access consciousness and metacognition,
abstracting from the phenomenal aspect. 
While other philosophers require metacog-
nition or reflexive consciousness in a system in
order  to  attribute  consciousness  (see  for  ex-
ample Rosenthal 2002 or Lau & Rosenthal 2011
for a recent review defending this view), we do
not want and cannot get into this discussion as
it is not our goal to review the different types of
taxonomies. We basically follow one valid and
common  perspective,  as  presented  by  Cleere-
mans, and apply it to our system in order to
analyze functions of our system that can match
the different phenomena described. We do not
aim with this approach to give a rigorous defini-
tion of consciousness (which does not seem suit-
able at this point, see also Holland & Goodman
2003). Instead, applying our approach, we aim
to provide insight into specific functions of our
system that  are  connected  to  the  phenomena
discussed.
10.1 Access consciousness 
In this section we want to focus on the aspects
of  access  consciousness  that  can  be  found  in
reaCog. Following Cleeremans, access conscious-
ness of a system is defined by the ability to plan
ahead, to guide actions, and to reason, as well
as to report verbally on the content of internal
representations. In contrast, non-conscious rep-
resentations cannot be used this way. Selecting
behaviors, planning ahead, and guiding actions
are the central tasks of reaCog (see section  4,
Planning ahead).
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Being able to use internal representations
for  verbal  report  is  currently  not  a  part  of
reaCog. However, the internal representation of
reaCog is already suited to allow for accessing
internal representations (section 5 and figure 7).
The simple solution proposed allows for commu-
nication  using  one-word  sentences  only,  but
provides a way, within the framework of reaCog,
for  the  symbol-grounding  problem  to  be  ad-
dressed.  Steels (2007;  Steels & Belpaeme 2005)
and  Narayanan (1997) have already studied in
detail  how  more  complex  sentences  may  be
grounded  in  simple  reactive  systems.  Thus,
there  already  exists  work  on  similar  systems
that shows how the ability to report by using
more complex language structures could be im-
plemented in  a reactive  system. Therefore,  at
least in principle, this property could be real-
ized in reaCog, too. 
The  last  property  describing  access  con-
sciousness, symbolic reasoning, is not addressed
by reaCog. In the symbolic domain, there are,
however, many interesting approaches in the lit-
erature  that  might  be  connected  to a  system
like  reaCog after  the  symbolic  level  has  been
implemented.
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Figure 9: A possible expansion of reaCog. Without the connections 1A and 1B the network enables the agent to rep-
resent its own actions, as is already possible for the network shown in figure 2, and figure 6. After introduction of con-
nections 1A and 1B the network is also able to represent the actions of a partner using the now shared procedure
“grasp”. (a) and (b) show two attractor states where active motivation units are depicted in red, whereas inactive mo -
tivation units are shown in black. Half circles indicate sensory input.
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Concerning  related  work,  Dehaene &
Changeux (2011) review relevant network mod-
els that are supposed to simulate consciousness,
including their own approach, which is termed
global  neural  workspace  theory  (GNW)  (see
also  Seth 2007 for  a  systematic  summary).  A
comparison  of  reaCog  with  these  approaches
can be found in Cruse & Schilling (2013)). Here
we  will  only  refer  to  one  important  notion,
“global availability” as used by several authors
to represent  a crucial  property of  access  con-
sciousness (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux 2011; De-
haene & Naccache 2001; Baars & Franklin 2007;
Cleeremans 2005). Global availability describes
the notion that many representations of the sys-
tem  can  potentially  become  conscious.  These
representations can be selected to solve a cur-
rent problem (as described for reaCog) or could
be selected in a task (see GNW). 
Are  the  representations  used  in  reaCog
globally  accessible?  During  execution  of  a
form of  behavior  the  reactive  system simply
reacts to sensory inputs. Single local modules
of the procedural memory are activated by the
context,  for  example,  the  walking  behavior
that can execute walking even in a cluttered
environment. While the behavior is driven by
sensory  stimuli,  it  is  not  “cognitively  atten-
ded”  and  runs  automatically  in  response  to
direct  interaction  with  the  environment.  In
this case, the representations are not attended
by cognitive expansion and are clearly not a
part of access consciousness. But, importantly,
this can change whenever a problem is detec-
ted and the reactive (automatic) system is not
sufficient anymore. In such a case, the WTA-
net of the attention controller is activated and
has to select one of the elements of the pro-
cedural  memory.  During  planning,  these  ele-
ments become accessible to the attention sys-
tem (Norman & Shallice 1986). The WTA-net,
which constitutes the essential part of the at-
tention  controller,  projects  directly  back  to
the motivation units of the procedural memor-
ies (figure  6, dashed arrows) and thereby se-
lects just one of the possible behaviors (due to
the characteristics  of  a Winner-Take-All  net-
work).  Therefore,  all  the procedural modules
that could be activated by the attention con-
troller are “globally available” and form pos-
sible elements of access consciousness.
10.2 Further relations between reaCog and
access consciousness
Another  interesting  property  of  reaCog  and
findings  in  psychology  concern  the  relation
between conscious and automatic procedures. It
is well known that humans are able to learn a
new behavior by consciously attending to that
behavior.  Over time, this can change and the
execution  of  the  behavior  becomes  more  and
more automatic, i.e., it is no longer necessary to
be consciously aware of the exact execution of
the behavior. A similar shift of attention can be
found when reaCog is planning new behaviors.
Triggered  by  the  activation  of  a  problem de-
tector, reaCog has to shift its attention towards
the new behavior during planning and the fol-
lowing execution of a behavior. As long as the
problem-detector is still active, the reactive sys-
tem is basically suspended (by switching off the
loop through the body), and instead the plan-
ning system tries out new procedures that have
to be attended to. After the successful execu-
tion the new solution can also be stored as a
procedural memory and become part of the re-
active system; it does not require cognitive at-
tention  anymore  (the  procedure  how to  store
this information has not yet been implemented
in  reaCog).  An  advantage  of  this  integration
into the reactive system is that access to react-
ive procedures is faster than using the cognitive
process,  which  agrees  with  the  findings  men-
tioned above. 
There  are  other  experimental  findings
highlighting the relation between conscious and
non-conscious  access  to  procedural  elements.
Beilock et al. (2002) found that athletes  who
have learned a behavior so that it can be per-
formed automatically perform worse when they
concentrate on the behavior compared to when
performing the behavior while being distracted.
In the attention controller of reaCog we can ob-
serve  a  similar  phenomenon.  If  the  attention
controller  is  externally  activated  by a  higher-
level unit while the connected behavior is per-
formed,  this  could  possibly  activate  learning.
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Such an influence would change the underlying
neuronal module and could worsen the result.
In  contrast,  without  attention  the  behavior
would  be  performed  as  it  had  been  learned
earlier.
ReaCog  differs  in  an  important  aspect
from the simulation studies conducted by De-
haene  and  colleagues,  as  well  as  from those
conducted by Baars and colleagues. While the
latter approaches aim to relate conscious func-
tioning to individual brain areas or brain cir-
cuits, reaCog is not intended at all as a model
of  the  human brain  or  any  of  its  areas.  In-
stead,  it  is  envisioned  as  a  reductionist  ap-
proach  that  focuses  only  on  function.  From
the bottom-up development of more and more
higher-level function we offer a post-hoc dis-
cussion  of  the  question  of  to  what  extent
reaCog shows aspects of access consciousness.
This approach seems particularly suitable for
addressing  access  consciousness,  as  it  turns
out that there is no single identifiable part of
reaCog that might be attributed the property
of  access  consciousness.  Instead,  access  con-
sciousness appears to be an emergent property
constituted by the complete system. Attention
controller,  procedural  memory,  and  the  con-
nections between those two parts,  as  well  as
the internal model and the ability to use it in
internal  simulation,  seem to  be  the  required
structures that allow access consciousness, or,
in other words, together constitute the “neural
workspace.” The dynamics of the neural work-
space  as  defined  by  Dehaene &  Naccache
(2001) are given through the WTA-net.  But,
and this is an important difference, there no
re-representation  in  this  neural  workspace  is
necessary. The already-present representations
can be reused in novel contexts. The existing
modules  of  procedural  memory are  recruited
in  the  internal  simulation  when  planning
ahead. The only difference is that the body is
decoupled from the control loop and instead
the loop through the world is  replaced by a
loop  using  internal  models  and their  predic-
tions as feedback. Together, these representa-
tions form the global  workspace (this  notion
of internal models  has been termed “second-
order embodiment,” c.f. Metzinger 2014). 
Koch &  Tsuchiya (2007) differentiate at-
tention  and  consciousness,  as  both  can  be
present individually and independently of each
other. They conclude that different mechanisms
are responsible for attention and consciousness.
While such a differentiation is of course based
on basic definitions, we can indeed identify dif-
ferent mechanisms related to these two phenom-
ena, even though they seem to be related. In
reaCog, attending to a specific stimulus is mod-
elled as a specific activation of motivation units.
Only if this activation is strong enough and/or
active for enough time, can the procedure enter
the  phenomenal  state  (section  7,  figure  8).
Therefore, both attention and the phenomenal
aspect  of  consciousness  refer  to  different,  but
tightly coupled properties of our system.
10.3 Metacognition
Although in this article we use the term cogni-
tion in the strict sense as proposed by  McFar-
land & Bösser (1993), when dealing with meta-
cognition, this definition is no longer generally
applicable.  Therefore, in this section the term
cognition is  used in  the usual,  more qualitat-
ively-defined way. We will describe how the mo-
tivation unit network could be expanded to al-
low our agent to be endowed with different as-
pects of metacognition. These expansions, how-
ever, have not yet been simulated by being im-
plemented into the complete network.
Metacognition,  or  reflexive  consciousness
(sometimes  called  metarepresentation),  the
second  essential  domain  of  consciousness,  ac-
cording to  Block (1995,  2001) and  Cleeremans
(2005),  is  characterized  by  Lau &  Rosenthal
(2011) as “cognition that is about another cog-
nitive process  as  opposed to about objects in
the world” (p. 365).
While the selection of procedures for con-
trol of behavior may occur on the reactive level
or by application of access consciousness, meta-
cognition in addition is able to exploit informa-
tion concerning a subject’s own internal states.
As a further property, a metacognitive system,
when selecting behavior, can represent itself  as
selecting this behavior (“I make the decision”).
Metzinger (2014) classifies this ability as third-
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order  embodiment,  where  the  subject’s  own
body is “explicitly represented as existing” (p.
274) and the “body as a whole” can turn “into
an  object  of  self-directed  attention”  (p.  275).
Thus,  metacognition  is  about  monitoring  in-
ternal states in order to exploit this knowledge
for the control of behavior. According to Cleere-
mans (2005),  metacognition may also be used
for inferring knowledge about the internal states
of  other  agents from observing  their  behavior
and for communicating a subject’s own states to
others. 
Let us first focus on the individual agent.
What kind of information might be used by a
metacognitive system? A typical case discussed
in the literature concerns some quality measure
of the procedure to be selected. During decision-
making, a person, when relying on own know-
ledge, needs to be able to access his or her own
internal state in order to estimate how sure he
or she is about the specific piece of knowledge.
Cleeremans et al. (2007) use as an illustrative
example  a  system  consisting  of  two  artificial
neural networks. While the first network learns
an input-output mapping of the task, the other
network,  as  a  second-order  network,  learns to
estimate a quality measure describing the per-
formance of the first-order network. As the com-
bination of the two networks does not only store
information  in  the  complete  system,  but  also
contains information about and for the system,
the authors conclude that such a system already
shows a limited form of metacognition. Such a
network, using an additional second-order sub-
net, might be implemented in our system, too.
For example,  motivation units could be activ-
ated by confidence, or quality values estimated
by such a second-order  network.  Such a situ-
ation can indeed be found in the network Nav-
inet.  Navinet  is  used  for  navigation  control
tasks and is inspired by work on navigation in
ants.  In  this  system,  the  salience  of  a  stored
stimulus  guides  memory  retrieval  (Cruse &
Wehner 2011;  Hoinville et  al. 2012).  For  in-
stance, the decision to choose one of many dif-
ferent food sources is influenced by the internal
representation  of  the  learned  food  quality
(Hoinville et al. 2012). As another example, the
confidence value of a visual landmark that is to
be followed or not might depend on the salience
of the visual stimulus, similar to the implement-
ation of a Bayesian-like system. A different ex-
ample is given by reaCog, which, by exploiting
its internal body model, is capable of represent-
ing its own body for internal simulation as well
as for control of behavior. Thus, at least some
basic  requirements  for  metacognition,  such  as
being able to use own internal representations
for the control of behavior, are fulfilled, if we,
again, leave the phenomenal aspect aside. Below
we will, in addition, briefly address the ability
of the agent to represent itself.
How may metacognition be suited to sup-
port  information  transfer  between  different
agents? We will not refer to communication us-
ing verbal or gestural symbols here. Instead, we
want to start with the ability to identify oneself
with another agent, or, in other words, to be
able to “step into the shoes of the other.” This
faculty has been referred to as Theory of Mind
(ToM). Central is the notion of being able to at-
tribute mental states to other agents (Premack
&  Woodruff 1978).  A classical example is  the
“Sally–Anne task”. In this experiment, two sub-
jects observe how a cover hides a piece of candy
lying  on a  table.  While  one  subject,  Sally,  is
outside of the room, the other subject, Anne, is
able to observe how the hidden candy is moved
to a new location. After the change the candy
lies underneath a white cover and not under the
black cover, which it did to start with. The cru-
cial  test  question is put to Anne: where does
she  think  Sally  will  search  for  the  candy?  If
Anne points to the white cover she only uses
her own current beliefs about the situation, but
does not apply a ToM, i.e., she does not take
into  account  what  Sally  believes—since  Sally
has not observed the switch. But if Anne points
to the original location, the black cover, she is
assumed to have a Theory of Mind as she oper-
ates on a set of mental states that she ascribes
to Sally.
ToM is  crucial  when  an  agent  needs  to
capture not only physical objects, but in addi-
tion represent other agents. It becomes neces-
sary to explicitly keep track of others’ observa-
tions,  plans,  and intentions. Only such agents
that can attribute mental states to other agents
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can  successfully  predict  their  behavior.  There
are  two  common  explanations  to  account  for
how ToM is realized. First, the so-called theory–
theory (Carruthers 1996) assumes that there are
dedicated, innate, or learned procedures that al-
low for prediction of internal states and there-
fore the behavior of others. We want to concen-
trate on the second main approach, namely sim-
ulation theory (Goldman 2005). 
Central to simulation theory is the already
introduced notion of an internal simulation. As
a prerequisite an agent needs an internal model
of him or herself. This model can be used (as
explained)  for  planning  ahead  using  internal
simulation. But in the same way this model can
also be recruited in order to represent another
agent.  Thereby,  other  agents  may be  mapped
onto the own internal model that allows simu-
lating the behavior of the other agent. This fac-
ulty would enable the agent to derive all sorts
of conclusions based on its own representations,
such as, for example, current goals or intentions.
In the case of reaCog, we envision an ex-
tension  that  allows  mapping  another  agent
onto the already existing internal  model.  In-
ternal  simulation  could  be  used  in  this  con-
text,  too.  Therefore,  the  application  of  such
an internal simulation of another agent could
lead  to  an  interpretation  of  the  behavior  of
the  other.  However,  the  two  theories  men-
tioned do not necessarily exclude each other,
as can be shown when regarding the proper-
ties of the cognitive expansion further. If the
interpretation found via an internal simulation
of another agent is new and succeeds in simu-
lating its behavior, the result could be stored
in the procedural memory in a similar way as
described for reaCog, when coming up with a
new solution to a given problem. In this way,
a new procedure has been learned that allows
for  prediction  of  the  behavior  of  the  other
agent. As such, application of simulation the-
ory might in the end lead to results that are
described as characterizing theory-theory. The
faculty of applying a ToM is currently beyond
the  ability  of  reaCog  as  described  above,
which allows for  an egocentric  view only.  In
the following, we will, however, sketch a way
in which such a network may be implemented
into the architecture of reaCog (for more de-
tails see Cruse & Schilling 2011).
Figure  9 shows  a  possible  expansion  of
reaCog.  Two  motivation  units  represent  the
state  “awake”  and  the  state  “sleep”,  respect-
ively. In the awake state, several sensory and/or
motor  elements  can  be  activated.  These  ele-
ments may form different contextual groups. To
simplify  matters,  here  we  focus  on  two  such
groups only. One group contains the procedure
“grasp” and a memory element representing the
visually-given input “position of an object” (rel-
ative to the agent), in this case the position of a
piece of candy (pos.candy), which is hidden un-
der a cover. We further assume that the agent
can also recognize, as a specific kind of object, a
conspecific (“partner”), (see  Steels &  Spranger
2008 and Spranger et al. 2009 for solutions), to
whom the agent can attribute properties. These
are,  in  our  example,  the  memory  elements
“face”  and  “position”,  which  stand  for  the
visual  appearance  and  spatial  location  of  the
partner  to  be  recognized.  Together  with  the
unit “partner” these motivation units form an
excitatory  network  (the  dashed  connections
marked 1A and 1B will be treated later). The
procedure “grasp” contains a body-model con-
sisting of an RNN (Schilling 2011) that contains
information on the arm used for grasping. This
network can be applied to both motor control
and recognition of the arm. The former function
is symbolized by the output arrow. Concerning
the latter function, the body-model is used to
minimize errors between the position of the in-
ternal model of an arm and the (underspecified)
visual input of the arm (e.g., Schilling 2011). If
the  error  could  be  made  small  enough,  the
visual input can be interpreted so as to match
the morphology and the specific spatial config-
uration  of  the  model  arm.  To  symbolize  this
capability, in figure  9 the procedure “grasp” is
also equipped with sensory (visual) input.
The network depicted in figure  9 (disreg-
arding  connections  1A  and  1B)  enables  the
agent to recognize the position of the candy and
to grasp it (“Ego grasp candy”), as indicated by
the motivation units marked red in figure 9a. It
further allows recognition of  the face and the
position of the partner. But it does not enable
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the  agent  to  “put  itself  into  the  partner’s
shoes”. In other words, the agent is not able to
realize that the partner may have his/her own
representation of the world. Thus, the capability
of a ToM is lacking.
The motivation unit connecting the agent-
related  elements “pos.candy”  and “grasp” has
been called “Ego” in the figures. Although not
required for the functioning of this network as
shown in figure 9a (disregarding connections 1A
and 1B), the application of the unit Ego would
allow the introduction of a Word-net represent-
ing the word “I”. Thus, with this expansion the
concept of “I”, as opposed to other agents (e.g.,
a partner), can be used by our agent, allowing
for  internal  states  like  “I  grasp  candy”,  and
therefore for self-representation.
Unit  Ego  is,  however,  necessary  in  our
framework  when  two  units  (here  “Ego”  and
“Partner”) share elements, as will be the case in
the following example, where we will enable the
agent  to  represent  the  partner  performing  a
grasping movement. To this end, we introduce
mutual excitatory connections between the unit
representing the partner and the procedural ele-
ment “grasp” (dashed excitatory connection 1A,
figure  9).  In  addition,  Unit  “Ego”  and  unit
“Partner” have to be connected via mutual in-
hibition (dashed inhibitory connection 1B, fig-
ure 9). This inhibitory connection has the effect
that only one of the units—either unit “Ego” or
unit “Partner”—can be activated at a given mo-
ment in time. With these additional connections
1A and 1B, the network can adopt the internal
state “Partner grasp candy”. This situation can
be represented in the agent’s memory by activa-
tion of the motivation units illustrated in figure
9b, highlighted in red. Note that the introduc-
tion of connections 1A and 1B does not alter
the ability of  the agent to represent the situ-
ation “Ego grasp candy” addressed above.
The architecture depicted in figure  9, in-
cluding connections 1A and 1B, has eventually
been  termed  the  application  of  “shared  cir-
cuits”, since the procedure “grasp” can be ad-
dressed by both unit “Ego” and unit “Partner”,
which strongly reminds us of properties charac-
terizing mirror neurons. Therefore,  application
of  such  shared circuits  has  been  described as
“mirroring” (Keysers & Gazzola 2007). Units of
the grasp-net (including the target pos.candy)
represent the movement and its goal, and thus
correspond to  representations  of  a  motor act,
such as has been attributed to mirror neurons
(Rizzolatti &  Luppino 2001).  The  grasping
movement in both cases (figure 9a, b) is repres-
ented as being viewed by the agent (“Ego grasp
candy”, figure  9a) or by the partner (“Partner
grasp candy”, figure 9b). This means that there
is still no ToM possible for the agent. To enable
the agent to develop a ToM, we need another
expansion. 
To explain this, we will present a simple
simulation  of  the  Sally–Anne  task  mentioned
above. Both protagonists, Sally and Anne, may
have different memory contents concerning the
position  of  the  candy.  This  means  that  the
agent, in this case Anne, needs to be able to
represent  some aspects  of  the  memory of  her
partner,  too.  Therefore,  the  memory  section
representing her partner will be equipped with a
memory  element  representing  the  position  of
the candy as viewed by her partner Sally, who
left  the room (figure  10,  connection  2).  Both
memory elements that have possible access to
the procedure “grasp” have to be connected by
mutual inhibition, so that only one of these ele-
ments  can  address  the  procedure  at  a  given
time in order to allow for sensible representa-
tion of the situation. Now imagine that the sub-
ject Anne is either equipped with a network as
depicted in figure  9, or that depicted in figure
10. Application of a system as shown in figure 9
means that the agent (Anne) has only one rep-
resentation of the candy’s position, namely the
one seen last. Therefore only this, correct, posi-
tion can be activated and it is imagined that
the  partner  grasps  the  correct  position—this
kind  of  prediction  is  observed  in  children
younger  than  about  four  years.  Anne  cannot
take  into  account  the  likely  assumption  her
partner  will  make  about  the  location  of  the
candy. In contrast, in a system as presented in
figure  10,  there  is  a  difference  in  thinking  of
oneself grasping the candy or the partner grasp-
ing it. When the agent, Anne, imagines herself
grasping the candy, she would grasp its position
as under the correct cover (figure 10a). If asked
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to simulate the internal state of her partner, as
is required in the case of the Sally–Anne test
(figure 10b), the position connected to her part-
ner Sally is used and the agent will rightfully
deduct that her partner’s grasp would be direc-
ted towards this position—which is wrong, but
this fact is not known by her partner. There-
fore, the network shown in figure  10 allows for
ToM, in contrast to the network shown in figure
9. The critical difference between both networks
is that the network shown in figure 10 contains
a  separate  representation  of  (a  part  of)  the
partner’s memory. This means that a comparat-
ively  simple  expansion  of  our  network  shows
how the agent could be equipped with the abil-
ity to apply ToM.
11 Discussion
Consciousness  and the relation  of  the outside
world  to  mental  representation  are  central  to
philosophy of mind, and have led to many di-
verse views (Vision 2011). While many of those
views appear plausible in themselves, especially
from a non-philosopher’s perspective, there ap-
pears  to  be  much  disagreement  among  philo-
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Figure 10: An expansion of the network shown in figure 9, allowing the agent to apply ToM. The expansion concerns
the introduction of a new memory element (“mem.candy”) plus connection # 2, which enable the agent to represent
the assumed content of the partner’s memory.
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sophers.  Many  of  the  positions  are  based  on
high-level views approaching consciousness in a
top-down  fashion.  In  contrast,  our  approach
starts from a low-level control system for a be-
having agent. The goal is the bottom-up devel-
opment of higher-level faculties. In this way, the
neural architecture implements a minimal cog-
nitive system that can be used as a hypothesis
for cognitive mechanisms and higher-level func-
tioning, which are testable in a real-world sys-
tem, for example, on a robot. This allows deriv-
ing  testable  and  quantitative  hypotheses  for
higher-level phenomena. In this way, a bottom-
up approach can nicely complement philosoph-
ical discussions focusing mainly on higher-level
aspects. In addition, such a minimal cognitive
system  can  provide  functional  descriptions  of
higher-level  properties.  We  briefly  introduced
the reaCog system in this article, following this
bottom-up approach. The central concern is the
emergent properties that can be identified when
analyzing this system. In particular, high-level
properties,  such as  emotions,  attention,  inten-
tion, volition, or consciousness have been con-
sidered here and related to the system.
From our point of view, such a bottom-up
approach leads to a system that can be used to
test quantitative hypotheses.  Even though the
system was not intended to model, for example,
consciousness,  the  system  can  be  thoroughly
analyzed  and  emergent  properties  can  be  re-
lated to mental phenomena. This is particularly
interesting, as high-level descriptions can leave a
lot of room for interpretation. In contrast, con-
necting mental phenomena to mechanisms of a
well-defined system allows for detailed studies
and clear-cut definitions on a functional level.
In this way, a system can be examined with re-
spect to many even diverging views and may al-
low  resolving  ambiguities.  Knowledge  gained
from analyzing the system can in this way in-
form philosophical  theories and refine existing
definitions by defining sufficient aspects as well
as missing criteria.
One might ask if higher-level phenomena
as  considered here are  not  simply too far  re-
moved  for  such  a  simple  system.  One  basic
problem is represented by the frequently-formu-
lated assumption that all these phenomena have
to be tied to the notion of an internal perspect-
ive and that phenomenality has a function in
and of itself. In contrast, we claim that focusing
on the functional aspect is a sensible approach.
It is possible because we believe that the phe-
nomenal  aspect  is  always  coupled  to  specific,
yet unknown, properties of the neuronal system
that, at the same time, have functional effects
and show subjective experience. In other words,
adopting a monist view, we assume that we can
circumvent the “hard” problem, i.e.,  the ques-
tion concerning the subjective aspect of mental
phenomena, without losing information concern-
ing the function of the underlying procedures.
Of  course,  we are  not  in  a  position to  claim
which of these structures, if any, are accompan-
ied by phenomenality. If, however, the function
of, for example, the artificial system indeed cor-
responds well enough to those of the neuronal
structures that are accompanied by phenomen-
ality, the artificial system may have this prop-
erty, too.
The  control  network  reaCog  consists  of
local  procedural  modules.  We  have  presented
two subnetworks: Walknet,  which aims at the
control  of  walking,  and  Navinet,  which  deals
with navigation. Both consist of a heterarchical
structure of motivation units that form a recur-
rent neural network. This, via competition and
cooperation between those units, allows for vari-
ous attractor  states  that  enforce  action selec-
tion. Selection of one or a group of procedures
protects  a  current  behavioral  context  against
non-relevant sensory input. An internal model
of the body is part of the control network co-
ordinating joint movements in walking. As this
model is quite flexible and predictive, it can be
used for planning ahead through internal simu-
lation. Following the definition of McFarland &
Bösser (1993), the network, since it is based on
reactive procedures and is capable of planning
ahead, can be termed a cognitive system, giving
rise to its name: reaCog. In combination with
the  attention  controller,  the  whole  framework
can  come  up  with  new  behavioral  solutions
when  encountering  problems,  i.e.,  behaviors
that are not automatically activated by the cur-
rent  context.  Internal  simulation  allows  us  to
test these behaviors and to come up with pre-
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dicted consequences, which can be used to guide
the selection process for the real system. The
attention  controller  cannot  function independ-
ently.  It  is  tightly  connected  to  the  reactive
structures. The procedural memory of the react-
ive system is further accompanied with percep-
tual memory and Word-nets, a specific form of
mixed procedural and perceptual memory. The
latter memory elements allow the introduction
of  symbolic  information.  Symbol-grounding  is
realized by specific connections between the mo-
tivation unit of a Word-net and its partner mo-
tivation  unit,  representing  the  corresponding
concept  in  the procedural  (or  the perceptual)
memory. 
Key characteristics of reaCog are modular-
ity,  heterarchy,  redundancy,  cross-modal  influ-
ences (e.g., path integration and landmark nav-
igation  in  Navinet),  bottom-up  and  top-down
attention control, i.e., the selection of relevant
sensory  inputs,  as  well  as  recruitment  of  in-
ternal models for planning. The complete con-
trol system constitutes a holistic system as the
central selection control process—including the
internal  body-model—is  implemented  as  an
RNN.  Overall,  reaCog  follows  Anderson’s
massive  redeployment  hypothesis  (Anderson
2010), since large parts of the reactive control
network  structure  are  reused  in  higher-level
tasks  (as  discussed  in  detail  in  section  4 for
planning ahead and in section  10.3 for Theory
of Mind). 
ReaCog nicely demonstrates how complex
behavior  can  emerge  from  the  interaction  of
simple control networks and coordination on a
local level, as well as through the loop through
the environment. Its feasibility is shown through
the implementation of the system at first in dy-
namic simulation (for Navinet on a two DoF,
wheeled  robot  platform;  for  Walknet  using  a
hexapod,  twenty-two  DoF  hexapod  robot).
Second, those control networks are currently ap-
plied to a real robot, called Hector (Schneider et
al. 2011).
Emergent  properties  are  properties  that
are to be addressed using levels of description
other than those used to describe the properties
of the elements. In the reactive part of the sys-
tem (Walknet, Navinet) we have already found
some emergent properties (development of dif-
ferent “gaits”, climbing over large gaps, finding
shortcuts in navigation characterized as cognit-
ive-map-like behavior) as well as forms of bot-
tom-up and top-down attention.  With respect
to  the  notion  of  access  consciousness,  several
contributing properties  are  present  in  reaCog.
Most notably, planning ahead through internal
simulation is central to reaCog. New behavioral
plans are tested in the internal simulation, thus
exploiting  the  existing  internal  model  and its
predictive capabilities. Only afterwards are suc-
cessful behaviors applied on the real agent. In
this way, the agent can deal with novel contexts
and is not restricted to the hard-wired structure
of the reactive system.
Furthermore,  the  system  shows  global
availability,  which means that elements of  the
procedural  memory  can  be  addressed  even  if
they do not belong to the current context. A
third property contributing to elements forming
access consciousness concerns the ability of the
system to communicate with an external super-
visor  by following  (i.e.,  understanding)  verbal
commands  and  by  reporting  on  its  internal
states. Therefore, except for the ability of lin-
guistic reasoning, which is clearly missing, the
issues characterizing access consciousness as lis-
ted  by  Cleeremans (2005)  are  fulfilled.  But
there are also disadvantages: (i) First, reactive
automatic control is faster. As cognitive control
involves internal simulation (and probably mul-
tiple simulations) the whole process takes more
time.  In  addition,  there  is  an  overhead  of
higher-level control going on in contrast to re-
active  control.  (ii)  While  access  consciousness
enables the system to deal with novel situations
and to come up with new behaviors, the same
processes might interfere when they are active
during processing of the reactive control level.
This  might  lead  to  worse  performance  when
both levels are active at the same time. Both
mentioned  drawbacks  have  been  confirmed  in
psychological  experiments.  We  have  not  dealt
with the subjective aspect of consciousness. But
leaving this aside, we have shown how reaCog
shows important constituent properties of access
consciousness and how it may provide, in this
way, a scaffold for a more complex system that
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can  manifest  additional  basic  aspects  of  con-
sciousness.
The property of having an internal body-
model and the property of being able to intern-
ally simulate behavior have been explicitly im-
plemented and can therefore not be considered
emergent properties in our approach. However,
when  referring  to  a  hypothetical  evolutionary
process that may have led to the development
of these properties, the appearance of the body-
model and of cognitive expansion might well be
characterized as representing an emergent prop-
erty.
We based our analysis and discussion on
the  perspective  of  Cleeremans,  and  used  his
concepts. One counter argument addressing the
notion of access consciousness is that this no-
tion is too unspecific as it does not help to dis-
tinguish between systems, and may cover “too
many” systems. For instance, one may ask, fol-
lowing a minimalist approach, whether this no-
tion of access consciousness might even include
programs like chess-playing software. One might
also ask whether there is a fundamental differ-
ence between such a system and a system like
reaCog.
While both systems are able to search for
the solution to a problem using internal simula-
tion, there are indeed crucial differences. A typ-
ical chess program would be not embodied, but,
obviously,  today  this  difference  can  be  easily
overcome and the system could be realized in a
robot equipped with a vision system and a hand
that could move the chess figures.
However, more importantly, the basic dif-
ference between such a chess player and reaCog
would be their flexibility in using internal mod-
els.  A  chess-playing  robot  always  operates
within the same context, which is stored in a
separate memory-domain, for example in a list
of symbolic rules. In contrast, reaCog basically
operates  with a reactive system, but can also
switch to the state of internal simulation when
a problem occurs. It then searches for a solution
by testing memory elements not  belonging to
the actual  context.  In other  words,  reaCog is
able to exchange information between different
contextual domains. Such a switch is not avail-
able to a chess-playing program at all. Such a
program  cannot  distinguish  between  different
contexts. In other words, there is no global ac-
cessibility  in  the  sense  described  for  systems
showing access consciousness. As a consequence,
the discussion of drawbacks connected with ac-
cess  consciousness  as  mentioned  in  the  above
paragraph on emergent properties,  that is,  is-
sues (i),  and (ii),  is  not  applicable  to such a
chess-playing system, and nor are the dynamical
effects observed in the experiments of Beilock et
al. (2002) 1 (section 10.2). 
The same holds for the phenomena of  a
psychological  refractory  period,  attentional
blink,  and the  masking  experiments  discussed
earlier in section  7. None of these phenomena
can be addressed by a classical chess-player sys-
tem, first, because due to the different architec-
tures, no search of a domain belonging to a dif-
ferent context is possible. A chess player does
not meet the requirements of access conscious-
ness as listed by Cleeremans 2005 and represen-
ted  by  reaCog.  Second,  no  specific  dynamics
can be found in such a chess-player system that
could be made responsible for the dynamical ef-
fects mentioned above and which may provide
the substrate for the occurrence of phenomenal
experience. Therefore, both systems are qualit-
atively different. If at all, the chess player may
correspond to a subsection of the symbolic do-
main of access consciousness, which has not yet
been explicitly addressed in this article.
In  an  earlier  paper  (Cruse &  Schilling
2013), taking a conservative position, we argued
that  properties  of  metacognition  could  not  be
found in the earlier version of reaCog. We have
now provided some new arguments that permit a
different position concerning this matter. Using
this architecture, the agent is able to monitor in-
ternal states and use this information to control
its behavior. Internal states may also be able to
represent the agent itself. A first expansion al-
lows representation of the activations of a part-
ner by using the same procedure as is used for
controlling the agent’s own behavior (application
of “shared” circuits, “mirroring”). Furthermore,
using  an  expansion  proposed  by  Cruse &
Schilling (2011), the agent is also able to exploit
and  represent  knowledge  about  the  internal
states of others, specifically by applying ToM. 
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Cruse &  Schilling (2011)  have  further
shown how this  network  can  be  expanded to
represent  the  discrimination  between  subject
and object (e.g., Ego push Partner) and to at-
tribute subjective experience (e.g., pain) to the
partner using a shared body-model. A further
expansion  that  allows  for  mutualism—two
agents  cooperate  to  reach  a  common  goal
(“shared intention”,  Tomasello 2009)—requires
two  body-models,  corresponding  to  what  To-
masello calls a we-model.
In the remainder of this section we briefly
mention some aspects not addressed by reaCog.
First, not all combinations of the elements ex-
plained for our network have been tested within
the complete system. For example, Walknet and
Navinet have been tested in separate software
and hardware simulations.  Second, we concen-
trated on solving motor problems alone, and did
not deal with how this system could solve prob-
lems in  the symbolic  domain at all.  From an
embodied point of view, this restriction is not
as problematic as it might initially seem, as the
solution  process  for  many  problems  can  be
traced back to abilities that are based on solv-
ing motor tasks (Glenberg & Gallese 2011); for
example this  holds true even for abstract do-
mains  such  as  mathematical  problem-solving
(Lakoff & Nunez 2000).
Finally, an important aspect not addressed
here in any detail concerns how learning of the
memory elements,  including the weight of the
motivation unit network, is possible. Examples
of  learning  position  and  quality  of  new  food
sources in Navinet are given by Hoinville et al.
(2012),  examples  of  learning  perceptual  net-
works, including the heterarchical arrangement
of  concepts,  are  given  by  Cruse &  Schilling
(2010a), but introduction of the ability to learn
such properties within the complete system has
not yet been introduced. 
12 Conclusion
We describe  a  way  to  construct  an  artificial
agent whose architecture is characterized by a
number of local, reactive procedures controlled
by an RNN, termed motivation unit  network.
This network is able to adopt various attractor
states, or internal states, which are able to pro-
tect  the  complete  system  from  sensory  input
not belonging to the current internal state. No
strict hierarchy can be observed in this network.
Instead, internal states may be represented by
partly overlapping state vectors.
Where  required,  further  procedures  have
been  introduced  that  can  be  interpreted  as
forming explicit representations of parts of the
environment. Specifically, an internal model of
the agent’s own body is introduced that can, as
a “manipulable” body-model, be used for plan-
ning new behaviors via internal simulation. In-
ternal  manipulation  is  possible  because  the
body-model, like a marionette puppet, able to
adopt all configurations the real body can as-
sume. This expansion allows the agent to switch
between reactive control and cognitive control
(in the sense of McFarland & Bösser 1993). 
When  aiming  to  study  higher  mental
properties, at least in human beings, we have to
deal with the phenomenal aspect of these prop-
erties. A number of experimental results suggest
that, i) some, but not all neuronal activities are,
under  specific—and  unknown  in  any  detail—
conditions equipped with a phenomenal aspect,
i.e.,  show  subjective  experience,  but  that  ii)
there is no specific function of this phenomenal
aspect  apart  from  the  functions  that  can  be
ascribed to the physical properties of the sys-
tem.  Note  that  this  does  not  mean  that  the
phenomenal aspect has no function. Rather, a
network adopts the function only when, at the
same  time,  the  phenomenal  aspect  is  given.
This view allows us to focus the analysis on the
functional aspect of the procedure (see section
7). However, due to our lack of knowledge, as
an external observer we cannot decide whether
a given internal state is a mental state or not (if
mental states are understood as internal states
that are equipped with a phenomenal aspect).
The complete network represents a collec-
tion of hypotheses that can be tested by com-
paring their properties with experimental data
and by trying to match them with theoretical
concepts. Examples studied in this article con-
cern  behaviors  that,  for  an external  observer,
may be conceptualized as various gait patterns,
or  navigation  using  an  internal  map,  on  the
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“lower” level. On a higher level, we deal with in-
venting new behaviors and planning ahead, as
well as phenomena attributed to mental states
like emotions, attention, intention, and volition.
Last but not least we compare the properties of
our  approach  with  different  aspects  of  con-
sciousness, such as access consciousness (includ-
ing global accessibility) and metacognition. We
claim that, at least in their basic form, these
phenomena can be attributed to internal states
emerging from the cooperation of decentralized
elements of our network. 
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